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'Art Today': Stokes, Pound, Freud and the word–image opposition

RICHARD READ

The subtle, difficult and neglected English twentieth-century art critic Adrian Stokes developed a complex and original if somewhat eccentric 'semiotic' theory of the relationship between words and images by synthesizing two antithetical authorities: Ezra Pound and Sigmund Freud. My interest in pointing to these sources has a twofold 'agenda'. One is the resemblance between Stokes's visual–verbal theory and contemporary theoretical interest in the relationship between *semiosis* and *semiotics*, where semiosis represents attention to the turbulent process of making and interpreting texts and images while semiotics represents the analysis of their objective and assumedly unmediated structures. Michael O'Toole has made a clear and helpful distinction between them:

> Semiosis, a term foregrounded by C. S. Peirce, shifts attention from the text of a semiotic message to the interpretative process whereby the listener or reader or viewer interprets the range of possible meanings that are embodied in the text. 'Meaning' thereby becomes something more labile and unpredictable than if it was being communicated in some kind of linear fashion from the artist through the text to the viewer.[1]

The other context of my essay is the larger disciplinary conflicts in which such local interpretations occur, both in the past and in the present.

I shall attempt to provide a reading of a single, short essay by Stokes of 1933 so as to produce a different account of his work from that which appeared in Geoffery Newman's article on 'Adrian Stokes and Venice' in a recent issue of the *British Journal of Aesthetics*. It is not that I entirely disagree with Newman's wholist view of the 'rightness unaffected by mysticism, idealism or moralizing' attributed to Stokes's aesthetic response to Venice as a collective work of art, with its 'eloquence ... directed, purposive; not romantic nor rhapsodic but precise and true'.[2] This is one way, indeed the principal way, in which Stokes wished to be read, and answers to a kind of neo-neo-classicism in successive generations of his readers.[3] What concerns me, however, is the way in which the impression of inevitable 'rightness', the apparent 'fit' between Stokes's words and the places and works of art he admired, is assumed to be an absolutely correct one for every reader for all time rather than the temporary end result of a necessarily incomplete synthesis of contending intellectual counter-currents whose turbulence, for some of his perceptive but unsympathetic early reviewers, still showed through the calm of his final effects.

G. Price-Jones, for example, a reviewer of Stokes's *Colour and Form* (1937) in the *Burlington Magazine*, employed a fastidiously classical style to make dry humour out of the dichotomy between the classical certainty of Stokes's spatialized visions and the subjective manner in which they were expressed:

> A certain spirality of mind, operating almost always amid the most delicate *nuances* of private perceptions, oblique angles and subjectively apocalyptic insights, makes it difficult to follow with confidence arguments which meander tantalizingly between the planes of abstract and concrete discourse.[4]

The confusion identified here is that of an undisciplined mind that spirals haplessly between planes of philosophical discourse that should be kept distinct.

In 1945, an anonymous reviewer for the *Times Literary Supplement* (Nikolas Pevsner) takes an evocation of sea-monsters invading Venice from Stokes's *Stones of Rimini* (1934) and declares:

> This is a truly Venetian vision, but it is not a Renaissance vision. Mr. Stokes violently abuses Ruskin for preaching one thing and being delighted with another, but does not this passage prove the very same to be true of himself? His conception of Venice as revealed by the fantasy of the sea monsters is thoroughly romantic and Northern.[5]

The confusion here is one of hypocrisy towards one's own tradition and cultural misrecognition of another. The value of both criticisms for my present argument is not their difference from Newman's verdict alone but the evidence they give, first, of tensions between the subjective responses of the critic and the objective qualities he imputed to the work of art. In both reviews Stokes stands accused of an implied transgression of fundamental categories of classicism and romanticism, categories that Stokes himself had wanted to sidestep through his own distinctions between carving and modelling which he claimed possessed no 'kind of correspondence with the ancient categories, classical and romantic'.[6]

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Second, however — to return to Newman's recent commentary — 'the fact that his writings cannot be classified as art history or art criticism or formal philosophical aesthetics gives them particular relevance at this time, when traditional demarcations between disciplines have become increasingly questioned', but then he ends by claiming: 'What is developed in the writings is less a psychoanalytic theory than an aesthetic philosophy.'[7] This is what has always happened to Stokes's work. It has been claimed for literature or art criticism or aesthetic philosophy, or more recently for literary, psychoanalytical or gender theory, or whatever the disciplinary and institutional affiliations of the various commentators have been. This is restrictive because although it serves to keep the drama of subject chauvinism in progress, it obscures the historical specificity of the way in which an English amateur, *relatively* free from the disciplinary divisions of university careers, was nevertheless compelled into exciting debates with rivals from other fields in ways which determined the nature of the theory he was making and the descriptions he devised to actualize it. Only by returning his work to its time can we see how different the disciplinary debates in which he intervened are from those of our own day.

It is to illuminate the turbulent intellectual cross-currents from which Stokes's calmer 'classic' works of art criticism were 'forged' (in a double sense for those early reviewers) that I choose a minor essay whose tone is as perplexed and perplexing as anything he wrote. That is 'Art Today' (1933), the first of five essays in the *Spectator* that helped to introduce a new school of English modernists, Barbara Hepworth, Ben Nicholson and Henry Moore, onto the public stage. Far from showing his writing at its evocative best (as do his interpretations of these artists' works), 'Art Today' nevertheless illuminates the pressures upon and within Stokes's thinking over a period when he was trying to approximate his ideas on the early Italian Renaissance to Modernist visual practice and deciding whether to integrate or choose between the aesthetic and psychoanalytic theories that attracted him.

The oddity of tone in 'Art Today' is perhaps partly due to the author finding himself in an invidious position. He had taken over the art column of the *Spectator* for a few weeks from Anthony Blunt who had written a wounding review of *The Quattro Cento* (1932) that, significantly for the argument of this essay, took to task the relationship between words and illustrations in that book. Referring to the outlandish captions to the illustrations in the book, Blunt wrote pertinently that:

> [i]t looks as though the author believed that these phrases had a value out of their context, and, if this is so, it casts considerable doubt on his realization of their need of explanation in context.[8]

He means that the monuments served as illustrations to the text rather than vice versa as an art historian would require. This very local objection would become the occasion in 'Art Today' for meditations on the word–image nexus that would make Blunt's complaint seem very narrow. Stokes was further in the position of having to introduce favourably Herbert Read's *Art Now*, a book he held distinctly ambivalent feelings towards despite the reverence in which it was held by the artists he too was promoting. Stokes's title 'Art Today' cooly depolemicizes Read's *Art Now* so as merely to explain a contemporary phenomenon instead of demanding its unqualified acceptance.[9] Third, in view of the reviews of modern artists he was about to publish in forthcoming weeks, there was the need to defend an abstract mode of art that ran partly against his representational credo and aesthetic tastes.

It is particularly in this last context that, settling into his temporary niche, Stokes adopts a camp tone towards several elements of contemporary aesthetic theory: 'camp', that is, in the specific contemporary sense of 'being frivolous about what meant most to one, being solemn about what mattered least',[10] and, one might add, creating the suspicion of meaning the opposite to what is written; his intention being not only to defend himself from Blunt but to scramble the currently dominant critical language of the Bloomsbury critics by supplanting it with his own.[11] But in the year before Pound wrote a review of Stokes's *Stones of Rimini* that effectively terminated their friendship, it was he who provided Stokes with the major context for the ambivalences I will point to in 'Art Today', for Stokes was here attempting experimentally to withdraw himself from the literary influence of Pound's ideas on Imagism so as to establish psychoanalysis as the basis of his own theory of visual art. Like a minor detail from a dream, an imperfect minor essay of this kind, uncomfortably locked into unresolved debates with peers, can shed greater light upon the foundations of a writer's thought than vastly more considered works.

I

Stokes's article is short enough to reproduce in its entirety:

Art Today

ALL MODERN VISUAL ART whatsoever, good or bad, 'advanced' or academic, is characterized by a self-conscious and literary approach. Art to us is manifestly a personal projection, a synthesis of experience. Though the musty garments of the past with which it was first clothed were extensive as may be, this personal and self-conscious aesthetic approach has been living for at least 80 years. In spite of neo-this and neo-that, in spite of the long talk of Form, the wan Victorian problem picture remains a more or less contemporary expression. The Surréalistes today give homage to the Victorian maxim that every picture should tell a story. Naturally, the conception of what stories provide suitable subjects for visual art, and the mode of their manipulation or concentration, has been developed. The difference between an academic and a Surréaliste

picture is the difference between arrant journalism with its wealth of judicious vulgarity and a Symbolist poem. Both one and the other are contemporary expressions. The positive side of modern painting whose detested ancestors are not the Impressionists so much as the Victorian academic painters is enormously advanced. Indeed, modern painting is now full-grown. The rapidity of this development is due to the study of simplified forms as purveyors in themselves of the most complicated emotions. This approach, of course, has not been the conscious aim of those painters responsible for its development: it was not for them, nor for any painter, to discern in what lay the intensity of the shapes that they contrived, except in terms of strictly visual relevance. They attempted to isolate visual relevance: as painters they were most self-conscious, even more so than the old Bohemians. The wider issue of their art was determined by our age, whose conditions in this respect I have no space even to mention. We may take it that the louder his protestation of purely visual values and the greater the abstraction that the true painter achieves, the more concentrated (in the manner of images in a poem), perhaps the more unconscious and therefore the more pervasive, is the literary content of his art. The painter of 'abstract' pictures is the true child of this age.

What is meant by 'literary' in this connexion? I mean that just as the fine poem has always been a selection of images that are matched by the words and rhythm expressing it, so the modern abstract picture (to take the logical extreme of the contemporary approach) is a reduction of experience to the scantiest visual terms. Some such process, it may be objected, has characterized not only all poetry but all art. Its modern aspect, however, is qualified by the degree in which the selective process has become conscious and personal, is pursued in art without reference to the dictation of State or Church. And since one associates the ideas of expressive abstraction and allusiveness primarily with the troubles of the entire human race to find satisfactory words by which to communicate their feelings, the use of the word 'literary' is not unjust. The concern of the Cubists was a prepossession with what they conceived as Form: it seems a natural and proper concern for artists. But that is no reason why we should interpret their art in those terms. Aesthetic criticism has talked largely in vain of Form and Design and Colour: let it pass. Modern abstraction needs no excuses nor weighted words. We witness the logical conclusion of 'every picture tells a story'. The story has now been reduced by the so-called modern movement entirely to visual terms: it is not always a story that can be put into words nor even provided with a suitable title. The more successful the picture the less can the experience it communicates be expressed by any other medium: whereas the experience recorded by the Victorian problem picture is now better treated by photography and cinema.

These reflections are prompted by a visit this week to the Mayor Gallery in Cork Street where a representative exhibition of work by 'advanced' artists of all styles and nationalities is being held, an exhibition planned to synchronize with the publication of Professor Herbert Read's *Art Now*. Modern art has survived the years of growth.[12]

By unravelling themes that run back through Stokes's work over seven years from the publication of 'Art Today' (1933), it is possible to reconstruct a subtle and suggestive argument that barely survives, however, the ambivalence of Stokes's terminology.

The essence of the argument is to pursue the development of modern visual art according to tensions within two sets of terms: the *self-consciousness* of the *visual form* of modern abstract art on the one hand, and the *unconsciousness* of its *literary content* on the other. He argues that both qualities derive not, as we might think, in reaction from French Impressionism but in development from Victorian academic problem painting, a strategy of recontextualization that polemically subverts the anti-bourgeois claims of Surrealism, a movement that was always to be Stokes's *bête noir*.[13] His argument, which is worthy of contemporary consideration, is that for all its radical pretensions, Surrealism is the product of the 'vulgar' petit-bourgeois imagination. This implies an élite position on Stokes's behalf, though the burden of his argument is that such a position, fortified by psychoanalysis, provides a goal for modern imagination as a whole.

Let us start with the antinomy between self-consciousness and unconsciousness:

> . . . modern painting is now full-grown. The rapidity of this development is due to the study of simplified forms as purveyors in themselves of the most complicated emotions. This approach, of course, has not been the conscious aim of those painters responsible for its development: it was not for them, nor for any painter, to discern in what lay the intensity of the shapes that they contrived, except in terms of strictly visual relevance. They attempted to isolate visual relevance: as painters they were most self-conscious . . .

This seems to take up two contradictory explanations of the modern artist at the same time, and both are to be found in Stokes's previous writings. On the one hand, because it is 'without reference to the dictation of State or Church', the process of modern visual art has become excessively 'conscious and personal'. On the other hand, its 'literary content' is 'the more unconscious and therefore the more pervasive' exactly in so far as the artist's conscious aim is distracted by a purely visual preoccupation.[14]

The terms of the debate derive from a contrast in *The Quattro Cento* between the conditions of Donatello working for public bodies such as the Signoria at Florence and Agostino di Duccio working on the Tempio Malatestiano at Rimini for the Renaissance dictator/patron Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta:

> The vague personalities of public bodies must be flattered by creations that are monumental or profusely dramatic. A greater power of co-ordination will be required of the artist, and a more individual aesthetic than the one which can be so largely imposed upon him from without by the miraculous clarity in the life of a princely patron.[15]

This idea is quite as confusing as it is in 'Art Today' because the 'more individual aesthetic' of the artist inspired by the princely patron finds expression in an 'anonymous spirit'.[16] The ambiguity between individualistic and anonymous aesthetics is explained, however, by the persisting influence from Stokes's earliest work of a distinction in E. M. Forster's essay on 'Anonymity: an Enquiry' of 1925:

> Just as words have two functions — information and creation — so each human mind has two personalities, one on the surface, one deeper down. The upper personality has a name. It is called S. T. Coleridge, or William Shakespeare, or Mrs Humphry Ward. It is conscious and alert, it does things like dining out, answering letters, etc., and it differs vividly and amusingly from other personalities. The lower personality is a very queer affair. In many ways it is a perfect fool, but without it there is no literature, because unless a man dips a bucket down into it occasionally he cannot produce first-class work. There is something general about it.[17]

In an immature early work (as he and others later thought it), *Sunrise in the West* (1926), Stokes expressed enthusiasm for Forster's essay with a caveat which untangles the anomalous relations of individualism and anonymity within his later theories of artistic patronage: 'The more marked our service to a peculiar sensibility, the greater our potentiality of anonymous freedom.'[18]

Stokes subjects Forster's notion of subconscious creativity to an Oedipal transformation: the greater the individuality of the paternal patron, the more the artist's subconscious is spurred on to anonymous creation. With the modern artists of 'Art Today', however, the artist is his own individual patron. To determine their own works modern artists are free, allegedly, even from the vague impetus of public bodies, let alone from the creative constraints of the princely individual patron. This, then, pertaining to patronage, is the first explanation of modern art in the essay. We shall see that consequently the dialectic between individual patron and unconscious artist is internalized into separate visual and literary operations *within* the artist and the art work.

First, however, before positing their interrelationship, we must turn in 'Art Today' to tensions between the definitions of 'literary' and 'visual'. Again there is a considerable background to the terminology. In a generally enthusiastic review of *The Quattro Cento* of the previous year, Pound had criticized Stokes's somewhat floribund criticism for displaying a love of 'this mixed product of literature and stone' as if there were something confused about it. Stokes here seems to embrace the criticism and turn the tables on it by regarding the most purely visual art as itself a compound of visual and literary elements. One should not imagine that modern abstract art lacks literary content merely because artists 'isolate visual relevance'. In the progress of modern art these elements develop symmetrically opposite relations with each other on account of their internalization of the patron/artist relationship. To the extent that the artist is *consciously* preoccupied with 'a reduction of experience to the scantiest visual terms' (something forced and meagre), his or her *unconscious* is free to produce a secondary literary content which is 'pervasive' with 'the most complicated emotions' (something very rich). The visual form is 'simplified' and overdetermined but the literary content is 'concentrated', 'pervasive' and intense.

A sliding scale results in the outright paradox that the more visual an artwork strives to be, the more literary it actually becomes:

> We may take it that the louder his protestation of purely visual values and the greater the abstraction that the true painter achieves, the more concentrated (in the manner of images in a poem), perhaps the more unconscious and therefore the more pervasive, is the literary content of his art. The painter of 'abstract' pictures is the true child of this age.

Concentrated 'in the manner of images in a poem' sounds like praise of Pound's definition of Imagism reprinted in *Gaudier-Brzeska: a Memoir* (1917). But to equate such concentration with a literary unconscious is praise that Pound, in his reiterated opposition to Freud, would not have wanted. And would one, either as a visual or verbal abstractionist, really want to be the true 'child' of the age, even if 'modern painting is now full grown', as Stokes later admits? In other words, is this praise or blame, and more particularly, is it pro- or anti-Poundian?

In later asking himself 'what is meant by "literary" in this connexion?', Stokes goes on to associate visual abstraction with a Poundian definition of the Image that is far from fully flattering:

> I mean that just as the fine poem has always been a selection of images that are matched by the words and rhythm expressing it, so the modern abstract picture (to take the logical extreme of the contemporary approach) is a reduction of experience to the scantiest visual terms.

The poem is 'fine' but 'reduction' and 'scantiest' are derogatory by contrast with the richness of the Freudian unconscious that Stokes had hitherto equated with the literary.[19] What is the reason for this ambivalence?

The problem is really that after years of attempting to reconcile contrary Poundian and Freudian connotations of the 'literary', Stokes is no longer able to stop them tearing apart from each other. Take two earlier allusions to 'literature' in *The Quattro Cento*:

> A Quattro Cento masterpiece, however, eludes the traps of aesthetic appraisal. These traps cannot govern emblematic momentum. Today we cry out for emblem. The aesthetic sense cries out for emblem, an aspect of art that is a proper subject for literature.[20]

Here literature is allied with a Poundian sense of the word 'emblem'[21] against 'traps of aesthetic appraisal' which we may safely read as Bloomsbury aesthetic formalism or the doctrine of 'significant form'. Later on in the book, however, literature is equated with psychology in ways that see them both being overwhelmed by the purely visual analysis of Bloomsbury formalism which should really be their equal partner in interpretation:

> . . . it gives me some cause for dismay to find that it would be quite irrelevant for me to describe his [Donatello's] work from the angle of pure aesthetic value. But the psychological approach is not the nonsense it was some thirty years ago, since, meanwhile, criticism has dilated upon purely aesthetic value. Indeed, there is now the danger that the more literary aspects of art, the aspects in which the co-ordination of art and life are implicit, the only aspects that are fit subject for literature, will be overwhelmed by considerations of pure aesthetic . . . Of course in the long run, a more psychological approach is not at variance with a more purely aesthetic approach. On the contrary, the former should be indispensable to the latter, and vice versa.[22]

Stokes assumes his reader knows what he means by the 'nonsense' that the psychological approach amounted to some thirty years ago, but it is now difficult to know whether he is speaking in general terms or of a specific psychological authority on art. Perhaps Freud's monograph on Leonardo (1910) is intended either as the nonsense or what replaced it. Or perhaps he is quarrelling with recent limitations set on what psychology in art might mean. I. A. Richards made one resonant objection in *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1924):

> . . . the attempt to display the inner working of the artist's mind by the evidence of his work alone must be subject to the gravest dangers. And to judge by the published work of Freud upon Leonardo da Vinci or of Jung upon Goethe . . . psycho-analysts tend to be peculiarly inept as critics.[23]

Pound and Fry are no less typical in reducing the 'psychology' of works of art to a kind of dramatic verisimilitude.[24] No one regards literature or psychology as primary elements in 'the co-ordination of art and life' as Stokes does. 'Co-ordination' in the sense of physical and mental deftness ascribed to the internal relations of visual forms turns out to be the essence of the synthesis that Stokes wished to define.

In 'Art Today', the literary is entirely psychologized. Stokes's answer to the question 'What is meant by the literary in this connexion' is that 'the expressive abstraction and allusiveness' of modern art is a necessarily lame response on the part of a confused modern world to 'the troubles of the entire human race to find satisfactory words by which to communicate their feelings'. It is the best, in other words, that can be made of the very bad job of *Civilization and its Discontents*. Ever resistant to the 'weighted words' of Bloomsbury aesthetics ('Aesthetic criticism has talked largely in vain of Form and Design and Colour'), Stokes performs a paradoxical manoeuvre to keep modern visual art in touch with the psycho-literary: 'We witness the logical conclusion of "every picture tells a story"'. This had been the narrative theme of Victorian academic painting from which the article had embarked:

> The story has now been reduced by the so-called modern movement entirely to visual terms: it is not always a story that can be put into words nor even provided with a suitable title. The more successful the picture the less can the experience it communicates be expressed by any other medium: whereas the experience recorded by the Victorian problem picture is now better treated by photograph and cinema.

The paradox is fascinating, but hardly perspicacious as it stands.

Part of the shock-value of Stokes's rapprochement would have been that at the time he was writing 'Art Today' the practices of literature and the visual arts had progressively moved apart from each other.[25] Perhaps unconscious of his own Bloomsbury bias against the literary in art, the painter and art critic Lawrence Gowing criticized the essay in 1978 as:

> . . . a protest against the notion of abstraction as an art of pure form deprived of content, at first sight a rather wilful one, which went to the opposite extreme and described the associative richness of modern art as literary.[26]

He misses the dimension of Stokes's argument that constitutes a complex response to Pound's account, reprinted in the Gaudier monograph, of the process of composing an Imagist poem. Stokes employs this account as an ultimately pejorative analogy for the process of visual abstraction in modern art. Peter Nicholls has glossed Pound's account as follows:

> Even Pound's 'In a Station of the Metro', one of the few imagist poems to efface the temporal frame of its original perception, was, as he is careful to explain in an account of the poem's genesis, the product of numerous rewritings and exercises in reduction after the event . . .[27]

This, I think, is what Stokes means by 'a reduction of experience to the scantiest visual terms' and the reduction of the story 'entirely to visual terms'. For Stokes the abstract picture was still only a compressed anecdote akin to the Poundian poem. The implied corollary is that the Poundian poem, though 'fine', was the equivalent only of a modern abstract painting.[28] Because it lacked spontaneous access to the deeper levels of unconscious compulsion, having to be worked and reworked according to laborious afterthoughts instead,[29] it transmuted the temporal element of story-telling only 'scantily' into the aesthetic finality that Stokes preferred. Its 'unconscious' was still ultimately

'literary' in the Victorian sense, for it lacked the instantaneous freshness and subconscious appeal of Cavalcanti's or Agostino di Duccio's Renaissance 'emblem'.

What instead is taking hold of Stokes's theorization of words in relation to images is something closely akin to Freud's position in *The Ego and the Id* that visual thinking 'stands nearer to unconscious processes than thinking in words, and it is unquestionably older than the latter both ontogenetically and phylogenetically'.[30] This I think is towards the heart of Stokes's defence of 'the instant poignancy of Agostino's carving' in *Stones of Rimini*, where he insists that 'we *see* Influence: we do not gather it from an accumulation of words',[31] 'Influence' being construed here according to the Renaissance 'psychology' of planetary emanations that constitute the distinctive identity or *virtù* of people and things. The importance of words, however, as Freud went on to say, is that 'the way in which something that is unconscious becomes preconscious' is 'by supplying *Pcs.* [the Preconscious] intermediate links through the work of analysis'.[32] Free association prepares the meaningful content repressed in *vision* for emergence into *verbal* understanding. Such proximity of visual thinking to unconscious processes goes far towards explaining the plotless, freely associative visuality of Stokes's most successful works. Psychoanalysis has superseded poetry and novels as the comprehensive discourse of human awareness.[33] What we see in 'Art Today' is the point at which unconscious psychoanalytic *ph*antasy takes over from Poundian literary *f*antasy as the model for Stokes's practice as an art critic. The conclusion that 'Modern art has survived the years of growth' is highly ambivalent because survival implies something short of true maturity or coming of age. As he puts it in a late essay that completes many of these earlier ideas from the developed viewpoint of Melanie Klein, his own analyst during the 1930s, 'the good objects, whole and part, survive, if barely; exist, if fitfully'.[34]

I have said that these passages from *The Ego and the Id* and elsewhere are towards the heart of Stokes's preoccupations in 'Art Today'. The heart itself, however, is a richly suggestive passage for the word–image opposition in the 'Considerations of Representability' chapter of Freud's section on 'The Dream-Work' in *The Interpretation of Dreams*.

> The direction taken by the displacement usually results in a colourless and abstract expression in the dream-thought being exchanged for a pictorial and concrete one. The advantage, and accordingly the purpose, of such a change jumps to the eyes. A thing that is pictorial is, from the point of view of a dream, a thing that is *capable of being represented*: it can be introduced into a situation in which abstract expressions offer the same kind of difficulties to representation as a political leading article in a newspaper would offer to an illustrator. But not only representability, but the interests of condensation and the censorship as well, can be the gainers from this exchange. A dream-thought is unusable so long as it is expressed in an abstract form; but when once it has been transformed into pictorial language, contrasts and identifications of the kind which the dream-work requires, and which it creates if they are not already present, can be established more easily than before between the new form of expression and the remainder of the material underlying the dream. This is so because in every language concrete terms, in consequence of the history of their development, are richer in associations than conceptual ones.[35]

Stokes reads this passage through modernist debates on the relative merits of representational and abstract art, something that could have meant nothing to Freud when he first wrote it in 1900. This accounts for a skewing of terms between their arguments. For Freud 'abstract' means the 'colourless . . . expression' of the dream-thought that does not have a medium as such, but which is equivalent to the coercive propaganda value, transparent to the understanding, of the political leading article whose language is an issue he cautiously avoids. Like the transformation of the dream-thoughts into the dream, the illustrator turns baldly political statements of the leading article into meanings that are indirect, for the 'concrete terms' of the pictorial medium 'are richer in associations than conceptual ones'. For Stokes the abstract is the modern pictorial form which the Bloomsbury critics had regarded as hostile to any kind of literary paraphrase. Despite this opposition of terms, the point of connection between Stokes and Freud is clear enough. Stokes's equivalent to the propaganda of the political leading article in Freud's example is the maxim of the Victorian problem painting that 'every picture tells a story'. Both Freud's illustrator and Stokes's modern artist seek to scramble and complicate tendentious meaning through *visual representation*. But it is precisely in the issue of whether the pictorial transformation scrambles *or* complicates the original meaning that a difference of agenda opens up between their arguments. Freud argues that the overt meaning of the dream-thought is censored by the concrete means of representation in the dream. The meanings of leading articles, like those of dream-thoughts, are 'unusable' so long as they remain in an abstract, that is unpictured, form. This constitutes 'difficulties to representation' in which 'the interests of . . . the censorship . . . can be the gainers'. When Freud examines in a later paragraph the active role of dream-thoughts upon the means of expression, he conceives of many dream-thoughts seizing upon single elements of dream at once, resulting in unintelligible 'ambiguity'. In a final example the neuroses employ words to the same effect, highlighting the 'purposes of . . . disguise' again. These are all instances in which 'our understanding is brought to a halt' by the event of representation. Stokes, by contrast, argues against the role of censorship in the visual

representation of the literary: while the intelligible subject-matter of Victorian painting is condensed into abstract visual form, its crude stories are refined into subtler literary and psychological content: 'simplified forms' are 'purveyors in themselves of the most complicated emotions'. We can sense in his argument an antithetical connection that is also a sliding scale (or differential ratio) between complex vagueness and simplified vividness. Our problem in sorting out their differences here is that Freud is saying something like this too.

From the outset Freud credits dreams with (at least) two simultaneous roles: 'not only representability, but the interests of condensation and the censorship as well'. Beyond the passage I have quoted, Freud's emphasis falls on the *communicative* aspects of representation. Concrete terms 'are richer in association than conceptual ones', their advantage being that they provide representability to that which is otherwise 'unusable'. The dream-work is seen to reduce 'dispersed dream-thoughts' to 'the most succinct and unified expression possible', apparently a gain for understanding. In an incisive example, Freud shows how thoughts in successive lines of a couplet seize upon a shared rhyme:

> No doubt the best poem will be one in which we fail to notice the intention of finding a rhyme, and in which the two thoughts have, by mutual influence, chosen from the very start a verbal expression which will allow a rhyme to emerge with only slight subsequent adjustment.

Here the emphasis is surely not on censorship but on the vividness by which a concrete mode of language links and clinches diverse meanings. In the subsequent discussion of verbal wit, censorship is aided by the ambiguous meanings of single words, but this is also the capacity 'to give expression to more than one of the dream-thoughts', a superabundance rather than a depletion of meaning.[36] Greater vividness, suggestibility and complication seem to be the lot of concrete expression, not censorship alone, which is why Freud (though apparently unconcerned with aesthetics) seems to regard the newspaper illustration as more *persuasive* than the leading article. Perhaps the core of the dilemma may be found in the initial formulation of the conditions of representability, where the transformation of dream-thoughts into pictorial language supplies 'contrasts and identifications . . . between the new form of expression and the remainder of the material underlying the dream'. It would seem that an 'identification' between a form of expression and the remainder of the dream pulls meaning through from the underlying material and perhaps extends it to new meanings, whereas a 'contrast', as an antithetical relation, still connects with that material but disguises and censors by reversal what remains beneath it. Undoubtedly the duality of Freud's argument stems partly from the difference between the dreamer's and the analyst's point of view: that which is witheld from the dreamer may be revealed to the analyst; and the same applies to the interpretive capacities of Stokes's artist and critic: 'it was not . . . for any painter . . . to discern in what lay the intensity of the shapes that they contrived', he writes. The Cubists were concerned with Form, but 'that is no reason why we should interpret their art in those terms'.[37]

Stokes noticed these divergent arguments in Freud's account of the dream-work and determined to pursue the model of enhanced communication against that of censorship. Freud's progression is from newspaper illustrations to poetry to verbal wit then back again to unconscious modes of censorship in neurosis. It is a parabola of examples in which the words of poetry and wit take over from illustration as the means of concretizing abstract expression. This will help Stokes to equate Pound's Imagism with abstract painting. But while Freud's examples always serve as analogies for dreams, much of the interest generated by the passage is due to the light it casts on those more conscious forms of expression — illustrations, poems and jokes. For Stokes the question is whether dreams supply the model for art works or vice-versa, for in his view the latter involves an integration of meaning and the former an impedance that might reduce art to a symptom. He is explicit about this in a letter to Lawrence Gowing of 25 November 1961:

> I consider 'paint — work' an admirable phrase, corresponding to something for which hitherto there has not been so economical and direct a denotation.[38] But in spite of the aesthetic suggestion of condensation, displacement and over-determination, I do not at present see an entire correspondence with 'dream-work' as prescribed by Freud where these activities are at the behest of the censor. For the paint-work has a constant *content* irrespective of subject-matter (dream-thought). It conveys a content to be ascribed to form that is lent to clothe the subject-matter (dream-thought). This is not a disguise for the subject-matter (already disguised) but a mode of integrating it with broader experiences. If one were to ascribe to dream-work an integrative factor irrespective of its role as disguise, then the correspondence might hold. This would mean that art had thrown light on the dream rather than vice versa. I hope I am going to hear you soon on the subject.

The letter establishes the groundwork for Stokes's late essay on 'The Image in Form' (1967), but it also confirms the Freudian infrastructure of 'Art Today'. What *exactly* it confirms in 'Art Today' is Stokes's determination to regard the censorship involved in the visual representability of dreams as primarily an agent for wider forms of integration and connection whereby pervasive literary content attaches itself to visual nuclei in a manner that *clothes* abstractions, allowing them to pass in public with suggestive richness. For this sense we might turn back to his

phrase in 'Art Today': 'the musty garments of the past with which it [modern art] were first clothed were extensive as may be'. The private meaning shines through the public apparel in a manner analogous to the way in which sublimation spreads what otherwise was an overdetermined and self-gratifying focus on the genitals over the entire body in a generalized attitude of loving regard.[39] Clothes maketh the man; sublimation connects dreams with art, and censorship separates them.

II

One reason why I have dwelt on Stokes's enigmatic and imperfect early essay 'Art Today' is because it sets the terms for many of Stokes's later positions, including his progressive dissociation from Pound. The sliding scale or differential ratio that Stokes ascribes to the interrelationship of visual form and literary content in modern art becomes an internal splitting or disassociation of sensibility that he would increasingly identify with Pound's aesthetic project as neurosis, the fourth of Freud's analogues with dream. To see how this might be, Pound's views on modern art and poetry in *Gaudier-Brzeska: a Memoir* need to be examined at even greater length (for the focus is more diffuse) than Stokes's in 'Art Today' and Freud's in 'Considerations of Representability':

> Three years ago in Paris I got out of a 'metro' train at La Concorde, and saw suddenly a beautiful face, and then another and another, and then a beautiful child's face, and then another beautiful woman, and I tried all that day to find words for what this had meant to me, and I could not find any words that seemed to me worthy, or as lovely as that sudden emotion. And that evening, as I went home along the Rue Raynouard, I was still trying and I found, suddenly, the expression. I do not mean that I found words, but there came an equation . . . not in speech, but in little splotches of colour. It was just that — a 'pattern', or hardly a pattern, if by 'pattern' you mean something with a 'repeat' in it. But it was a word, the beginning, for me, of a language in colour. I do not mean that I was unfamiliar with the kindergarten stories about colours being like tones in music. I think that sort of thing is nonsense. If you try to make notes permanently correspond with particular colours, it is like tying narrow meanings to symbols.
>
> That evening, in the Rue Raynouard, I realized quite vividly that if I were a painter, or if I had, often, *that kind* of emotion, or even if I had the energy to get paints and brushes and keep at it, I might found a new school of painting, of 'non-representative' painting, a painting that would speak only by arrangements in colour.
>
> And so, when I came to read Kandinsky's chapter on the language of form and colour, I found little that was new to me. I only felt that some one else understood what I understood, and had written it out very clearly. It seems quite natural to me that an artist should have just as much pleasure in an arrangement of planes or in a pattern of figures, as in painting portraits of fine ladies, or in portraying the Mother of God as the symbolists bid us. . .
>
> Any mind that is worth calling a mind must have needs beyond the existing categories of language, just as a painter must have pigments or shades more numerous than the existing names of the colours.
>
> Perhaps this is enough to explain the words in my 'Vortex'* [*Appearing in the July number of *Blast.*] —
>
> 'Every concept, every emotion, presents itself to the vivid consciousness in some primary form. It belongs to the art of this form.'
>
> That is to say, my experience in Paris should have gone into paint. If instead of colour I had perceived sound or planes in relation, I should have expressed it in music or in sculpture. Colour was, in that instance, the 'primary pigment'; I mean that it was the first adequate equation that came into consciousness. The Vorticist uses the 'primary pigment'. Vorticism is art before it has spread itself into flaccidity, into elaboration and secondary applications.
>
> What I have said of one vorticist art can be transposed for another vorticist art. But let me go on then with my own branch of vorticisim, about which I can probably speak with greater clarity. All poetic language is the language of exploration. Since the beginning of bad writing, writers have used images as ornaments. The point of Imagisme is that it does not use images *as ornaments.* The image is itself the speech. The image is the word beyond formulated language. . .
>
> The Japanese have had the sense of exploration. They have understood the beauty of this sort of knowing. A Chinaman said long ago that if a man can't say what he has to say in twelve lines he had better keep quiet. The Japanese have evolved the still shorter form of the *hokku.* . . .

Pound then gives two examples of the Japanese form, then continues:

> The 'one image poem' is a form of super-position, that is to say, it is one idea set on top of another. I found it useful in getting out of the impasse in which I had been left by my metro emotion. I wrote a thirty-line poem, and destroyed it because it was what we call work 'of second intensity'. Six months later I made a poem half that length; a year later I made the following *hokku*-like sentence:-
>
> 'The apparition of these faces in the crowd:
> Petals, on a wet, black bough.'
>
> I dare say it is meaningless unless one has drifted into a certain vein of thought. . . . In a poem of this sort one is trying to record the precise instant when a thing outward and objective transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and subjective.
>
> This particular sort of consciousness has not been identified with impressionist art. I think it is worthy of attention.
>
> The logical end of impressionist art is the cinematograph. The state of mind of the impressionist tends to become cinematographical. Or, to put it another way, the cinematograph does away with the need of a lot of impressionist art.
>
> There are two opposed ways of thinking of a man: firstly, you may think of him as that toward which perception

> moves, as the toy of circumstance, as the plastic substance *receiving* impressions; secondly, you may think of him as directing a certain fluid force against circumstance, as *conceiving* instead of merely reflecting and observing. One does not claim that one way is better than the other, one notes a diversity of the temperament. The two camps always exist. In the 'eighties there were symbolists opposed to impressionists, now you have vorticism, which is, roughly speaking, expressionism, neo-cubism, and imagism gathered together in one camp and futurism in the other. Futurism is descended from impressionism. It is, in so far as it is an art movement, a kind of accelerated impressionism. It is a spreading, or surface art, as opposed to vorticism, which is intensive.
>
> The vorticist has not this curious tic for destroying past glories.[40]

First we should appreciate that 'Art Today' responds to Pound's passage as closely as it does to Freud's. Stokes appropriates Pound's conception of a fundamental identity between modern poetry and abstract art but reverses the historical arguments on which it is based. Pound argues that Futurism and the cinema tacitly perpetuate impressionism's passive stance towards reality while Vorticism breaks sharply with the symbolist's reliance on bourgeois subject-matter. These continuous and discontinuous traditions culminate in an opposition wherein the Vorticist rejects the passivity that the Futurist retains. Displaying to advantage the 'flexible comprehension of opposing viewpoints' inculcated by his undergraduate training at Oxford,[41] Stokes deftly unpicks and reverses these historical arguments. At one end of the historical spectrum he displaces symbolism into Victorian academic art while at the other end he makes 'Surréaliste' art (its pretentiousness enforced by foreign spelling) stand in for Pound's use of Kandinsky's *Art of the Spiritual*. Second, he reverses the nature of the linkages between them by cancelling Impressionism as an origin for modern art and confining its influence to mass media alone, though in this he directly appropriates Pound's dictum that 'The logical end of impressionist art is the cinematograph'. Correspondingly, where Vorticism broke with the sentimentality of the symbolists in 'painting portraits of fine ladies, or in portraying the Mother of God as the symbolists bid us', 'Surréaliste' art becomes the hated inheritor of 'wan' Victorian painting. Finally, Stokes lumps together the separate camps of modern art that Pound was at pains to oppose. For Stokes there is little to choose between the Cubists and Surrealists that are mentioned and the Vorticists and Futurists that are not. All of them pave the way for Pound's 'new school . . . of "non-representative" painting'. All (implicitly) are guilty of 'destroying past glories'. Stokes's disagreement with Pound transcends specific histories and judgements of taste, however. The crux of the matter concerns the operating principles of art and the way in which Pound defines them in surreptitious rivalry with Freud's account of the dream-work on which Stokes's essay was so much more respectfully based.

As Pound rehearses Kandinsky's thesis concerning abstract form as the vehicle for inner feeling, he prevaricates over the meaning of the word 'pattern':

> I do not mean that I found words, but there came an equation . . . not in speech, but in little splotches of colour. It was just that — a 'pattern', or hardly a pattern, if by 'pattern' you mean something with a 'repeat' in it. But it was a word, the beginning for me, of a language in colour.

The defensive tone in which he rejects the idea of a 'repeat' in the 'pattern' raises the possibility that he is trying to avoid too close a comparison with Freud's analysis of poetic rhyme in which 'two thoughts have . . . chosen . . . a verbal expression which will allow a rhyme to emerge'. On the other hand, Pound's larger argument that the 'image is the word beyond formulated language', resembles Freud's account of the advantages of pictorial form for the representation (or censorship) of dream-thoughts.

We hear the word 'pattern' again in the draft of a letter Stokes wrote in answer to an enquiry from Donald Davie in 1956. Ostensibly directed at the Cantos, the critique seems as pertinent to the successive revisions of 'In a Station of the Metro':

> Ezra's Cantos perfects his talk. He has long practised each anecdote that lives for the transformation into words. The verbal pattern, succinctness, its memorability because of tone or collocation of tones = the abstract in visual art.[42] Yet because there is no key, no other form of projection, it is also diffuse, a rambling locked to precision in words. Is his one of the aberrations of the formal? Too young & frisky.[43]

The passage also reiterates a number of elements from 'Art Today' two decades earlier: laborious compression of anecdote into poetry, the equation of verbal pattern with visual abstraction, excessive formality as an aberration and the association of all these traits with a permanently immature outlook (for 'young & frisky' is otherwise a curious phrase to characterize the work of a man his senior by almost two decades). In confining Pound's 'precision' to words instead of meaning, there is the added implication that the splitting, rambling and diffuseness of his poetry are due to the lack of any general theoretical 'key' such as psychoanalysis might provide to guard against neurosis in the creation of artistic meaning.

This raises the issue of Pound's attitude towards Freud's dream-theory in his explanation of 'In a Station of the Metro'. What aspects of it are accepted or rejected? While insisting on the need for laborious craftsmanship in the successive revisions, he clearly rejects the mediating role of representation in Freud's 'Conditions of Representability': 'Vorticism is art before it has spread itself into flaccidity, into elaboration and secondary

applications'. The expressions of Imagist poetry are somehow to be understood as unmediated and direct. They leave no time for thoughts to draw upon rhymes or imitations through mutual influence upon each other that Freud supposed necessary to the art. To remove the intermediary means of representation in this way leads to an apparent contradiction in Pound's argument. On the one hand the poem records 'the precise instant when a thing outward and objective transforms itself, or darts into a thing inward and subjective'. It is like a photographic image of the moment when an external impression invades and colonizes the involuntary human psyche. On the other hand, the Vorticist is accounted superior to the Futurist for actively transforming the original stimulus with 'sudden emotion'. Here the metaphors are sexually explicit. Whereas the Futurist is penetrated by experience, as 'the toy of circumstance, as the plastic substance *receiving* impressions', the Vorticist adopts the masculine role of 'directing a certain fluid force against circumstance, ... *conceiving* instead of merely reflecting and observing'. The 'secondary applications' of mimetic art involve a lack of virile energy, a detumescence or flaccidity.

In one sense this contradiction between the active agency of the stimulus *and* of the creator is only apparent. Whether the transformation tends outwards or inwards, and whatever the degree of clarity achieved, distortion is involved. As the (introjected) stimulus and (projected) feelings seize upon and modify each other, *mis*prision (in the case of words) or *mis*representation (in the case of images) marks off the active force of the poetic superman, acting his reactions, from the slavish imitations of the Futurist man of *ressentiment*.[44] But what is the nature of the distortion? On the one hand Pound seems to respond to that richer, communicative side of Freud's theory of dreams against the other side of censorship. He agrees with Freud that words are 'nodal points of numerous ideas';[45] they are not held in one-to-one correspondences like Kandinsky's conception of colours tied to single notes, for this 'is like tying narrow meanings to symbols'. Stokes seems to associate Pound with this dimension of Freud's thought in his late essay on 'Collages':

> It was in fact poets who first of our time employed a bared dualism. Since many words have numerous overtones, it became important to allow to them their varied actuality even while they were pressed into the service of a narrow theme.[46]

'Narrow theme', however, alerts us to the possibility that censorship, restricted access to meaning, plays the major role in Pound's use of Freud's theory of dreams and constitutes the major obstacle to Stokes's acceptance of Poundian poetics.

When Pound pursues Kandinsky's notion of abstraction into the Japanese haiku form, displacement, condensation and censorship triumph over richness of communication. The '"one image poem" is a form of super-position, that is to say, it is one idea set on top of another'. This is borne out by the specific mechanism of Pound's own poem, which works against the folksy mode in which it is explained. Through the common element of an abstract visual form — a dark cylinder from which pale, rounded forms emerge — the Oriental image of the bough of blossoms is set in apposition on top of the Metro scene so as to obscure it with vivid differences of light, texture, cultural milieu and naturalism (the secondary *image* is not abstract but the disjunctive effect of its production is):

> The apparition of these faces in the crowd
> Petals on a wet, black bough.

As with vision, so with sound. Freud had written that: 'No doubt the best poem will be one in which we fail to notice the intention of finding a rhyme.' Despite Pound's rejection of formal repetitions, his poem does involve a 'repeat' in the form of the rhyme 'crowd'/'bough', but the feminine-ending of 'bough' is sufficiently remote from the cloddish sound of 'crowd' to idealize it out of memory; we 'fail to notice the intention'.

Censorship by idealization characterizes many levels of the poem's meaning. John Carey has glossed it as an instance of the intellectual's hatred of the masses. The crowds of the metro are concealed by transformation into pastoral. First the beautiful women and child of the modern metro are isolated from the crowd then distanced into the ancient Japanese cultural imagery and *hokku* form of the unmoving bough of blossoms.[47] In this there is a triple censorship. First, the poet's 'sudden emotion' springs up to deprive living people of their identity; 'it' selects and changes 'them'. Second, Pound substitutes exotic Oriental imagery for the more conventional *Christian* symbolism of the bough of blossoms that Freud gives as an example of repressed childhood female sexuality in an earlier chapter of *The Interpretation of Dreams*.[48] Finally, while resisting conventional Christian associations in this way, Pound's explanation of the poem leans so heavily on Kandinsky's *Art of the Spiritual* that mystical significance is preserved against the rational incursions of psychoanalysis, even though his method of elucidating the condensed poetic imagery resembles the analyst's lengthy explanations of dream fragments. The common feature of all three 'super-positions' of meaning — displacement of the masses, anti-Christian Orientalism and anti-Freudian mysticism — is that they operate according to the Freudian principles of censorship in dreams. Like the cryptic meaning of the Tempio's insignia in the Cantos, the meaning of the poem is reserved for initiates and denied to the common herd.

Stokes's plea for the work of art as a form of meaningful connection with wider experiences is at odds with this. However down-to-earth and colloquial Pound's demon-

stration of poetic composition may be, to suppress instead of construct links, to subvert reality into disembodied emotions and to abstract rather than to externalize emotions risks an arid and neurotic dogmatism. Dogmatism and neurosis, indeed, are very much the theme of Stokes's last recorded utterance on Pound. In the final verse of 'Visit Postponed (1926)' of the early 1970s,

> No schema of emotion sets.
> The voided street lacks votary.
> Opinion has no form.[49]

The date in the title implies that from the first year of their acquaintance Stokes refused to become a 'votary' in Pound's poetic cult of pagan sexuality.[50] The emphasis is slightly different from the judgement in the Davie letter earlier: the aberrant abstractionism of the poetry now irks him less than the incoherent 'emotion' and dogmatic 'opinion' behind it.[51] From his later Kleinean standpoint, Pound and his poetry belong to the schizoid-paranoid position. What remains constant in both verdicts on Pound, however, is a sense of disjunction between literary form and content (but also an improper fusion of them), a disjunction that implies a lack of organizing Form for the stable manifestation of the Mind.[52]

Pound has said that 'vorticism is' — amongst other things — 'expressionism'. This is Stokes's *point d'appui* for a further use of Freud which saw 'the turning of subject into object' in the representational art he preferred.[53] Though the words expressive and expressiveness frequently occur in Stokes's oeuvre, they are never used in the German or Poundian senses of 'expressionism' as an extrusion of emotion into pliable paint or sound. From 'Art Today' onwards Stokes invaded expressionism in those senses of the word with representational theory. In the colour, form and content of a work of art, the mind is not expressed, it is represented. Necessarily the word takes on a double sense. There is re-presentation wherein inanimate materials take on the illusion of life in the Hegelian sense.[54] But there is also the traditional sense of producing a likeness of something through accomplished technical means. This provides the detachment that Stokes required from expressionism, but we shall see that it also reintroduced the ancient quandary of requiring visual resemblance to something invisible: the human mind.[55]

Stokes's late essay on 'The Image in Form' is his final statement of an anti-Poundian position. There the secondary power of all art is to articulate an image of the integrated Ego by finding larger relations for thoughts and feelings in outward visual structures which are indifferently figurative or abstract (he begins with the 'image' of an abstract sculpture by Anthony Caro, for example). As in his writings of the 1930s it is again a matter of *co-ordinating* art and life. The question in 'Art Today' — 'What is meant by the "literary"' — becomes

> Integration or co-ordination of what? it will be asked. Some aspect, I have argued elsewhere, of the integration of experience, of the self, with which is bound up the integrity of other people and of other things as separate, even though the artist has identified an aspect of himself with the object, has transfixed the object with his own compulsion, though not to the extent of utterly overpowering its otherness. These perceptions of relationship that are the basis of a minimum sanity demand reinforcement. Outwardness, a physical or concrete adaptation of relationship, spells out enlargement, means certainty.[56]

The sign that Stokes is improving on but also consolidating the verbal–visual opposition first brought out in 'Art Today' is the slightly later phrase 'unique for the eye but generalized for the mind',[57] which preserves the ratio of visual precision and literary vagueness from the earlier essay.

Elaborated also in 'The Image in Form' are the Freudian foundations of dream:

> Form is the container for a sum of meanings while it is from a concatenation of meanings that form is constructed, meanings that have been translated into terms of spatial significance. Without appreciation of spatial value, of empathy with bodies in space, there can be no understanding of emotive images that form conveys.[58]

A difference from 'Art Today', however, is that there is less danger of 'concrete thinking', the agglutination of the signifier with the signified implied by Pound's claim that 'The image is itself the speech' (which is the *re-presentation* half of Stokes's full theory of art as the representation of mind). This objection to visual and verbal abstraction had hovered as potential criticism of Pound in 'Art Today', but now the separation of visual artefacts from the sphere of verbal meaning becomes crucial. It is *through* separation out in space that meaning is held and articulated. Towards the end of this essay Stokes devises a supple passage of homology in which subtle catechretic metaphors are used to evoke simultaneous identity and difference between parts of speech and the components of visual form:[59]

> In any visual construction we require not only provocative nouns, so to speak, of insistent shape but equally interconnexion, the action one upon another, analogous to the role of verbs upon which a statement depends. Since the glimmering nouns behind the concrete forms are strongly comprehensive yet ambiguous, the fixing verb-function of composition is likely to be many-sided. Moreover all the statements of whatever kind in a picture tend to be very closely interconnected since they are apprehended together, since their contents are simultaneously revealed. A great painter like Seurat is able to extract the utmost significance for his compositions from the slightest variation in a few dominant forms or directions.[60]

III

Stokes is likely to have first gained such insights into the verbal underpinnings of vision (and vice versa) from undergraduate study of F. H. Bradley's philosophical work *Appearance and Reality: a Metaphysical Essay* (1893). The absence of a role for adjectives amongst those for nouns and verbs in the last quotation is tellingly derived from Bradley in this respect:

> The argument shows everywhere that things have secondary qualities only for an organ; and that the organ itself has these qualities in no other way. They are found to be adjectives, somehow supervening on relations of the extended. The extended only is real.[61]

Virgil C. Aldrich shrewdly limited the scope of Stokes's debts to philosophy in a posthumous review of *The Image in Form* (1972). This anthology, he argues:

> . . . will be appreciated only by those philosophers who have had a leg in the older philosophical tradition of objective idealism consummated in Bradley and Bosanquet, with its fundamental principle of 'identity-in-difference' and the 'external world' as a set of objectifications of the ego.[62]

Throughout this essay I have pointed to the contest between literature and psychoanalysis for possession of the visual image in 'Art Today'. I have done so in order to challenge the priority that Geoffrey Newman gave to philosophy in his account of Stokes's Venetian art criticism, but I do not mean to decry the role of philosophy altogether or at all in Stokes's work except to suggest that it is largely Kant's philosophy and that of the English post-Hegelian Idealist F.H. Bradley that is involved, not Philosophy written with a capital.

Bradley relegated Appearance of the phenomenal world to the transcendent Reality of the Absolute, which consists, however, in nothing more than the sum total of phenomenal appearance. Interdependence (identity-in-difference) is Bradley's term for the mutual dependency of Reality and Appearance and the mode of their interaction. Stokes's earliest response to a work of architecture — the Taj Mahal — was essentially an illustration of Bradley's Absolute (Reality) as contemplated from the side of Appearance. In his subsequent writings the East would serve as a 'colourless background' to the visual manifestations of the Mediterranean (in Kantian terms, a numinous setting for the manifestation of phenomena).[63] In its concentrated form, the Bradleyan Absolute would migrate in Stokes's writings from the Taj Mahal (1925) to Giorgione's painting of the Castel Franco Madonna (1926) to Venice (1932) to the Tempio at Rimini (1934) and then into the relationships of 'identity-in-difference' between colour and form in the paintings evoked in the book of that title, *Colour and Form* (1937). The buildings in the twenty photographs selected for individual discussion in *Venice: an Aspect of Art* (1945) are not in any simple sense described; they are turned into kinds of visual theorem, each ending with a Q.E.D.: a building's details 'are resolved in a kind of geometrical sum'.[64] The influence of Bradley's philosophy is registered in Stokes's art criticism right up to his last essays, in fact.[65]

Meanwhile Stokes read Freud through Bradleyan spectacles. In the passage of *The Interpretation of Dreams* that has preoccupied us most, he is likely to have read Bradley's distinction between Reality (the Absolute) and Appearance into Freud's distinction between a 'colourless and abstract expression' and a 'pictorial and concrete one' in the formation of dreams. So too the 'contrasts and identifications' which Freud identified as the enabling features of dream-representation would have reminded Stokes of Bradley's theory of identity-in-difference. Ultimately Stokes internalized Bradley's Absolute into the Freudian unconscious.[66] His 'Image' stands to 'Form' as Bradley's Reality stands to Appearance and as the Freudian Id stands to the Ego. In *Venice: an Aspect of Form*, preoccupation with 'inner dark ferment in architectural form' anticipates the later thesis of 'Image in Form'.[67]

Without at all denying the value that Newman finds in Stokes's writings on Venice, the 'fit' he praises between city and words is all the more interesting for being Absolute only within these specific terms. Let us confine ourselves for the moment to some of Newman's own quotations from *Venice: an Aspect of Art*: 'I remark the frequent recurrence of the word "interchange", and of related words such as "commerce".'[68] These words, together with 'intercourse', 'intercommunication', 'interdependence' and the rest, enact Bradley's principle of Interdependence within the visual field,[69] only now the principle is translated into Freudian terms. This is confirmed in a late essay where it is suggested that 'the phrase "identity in difference" . . . might be used . . . to describe succinctly the result of an act of projective identification, a mechanism . . . which . . . exemplifies both condensation and displacement'.[70] Newman goes on to remark upon Stokes's discussion of the Torre dell' Orologio arch in which the architecture, not the photograph, is said to have integrated the accidental features of a man's tie and a boy's head into the final aesthetic effect: 'the architectural members, not the accidents of the photograph, incline the mind to seize the connections which these accidents afford'.[71] Whatever the justice of Newman's invocation of Richard Wollheim's philosophical theory that the effect of such accidents can be secured for art by an extension of the aesthetic attitude from art itself,[72] there can be no doubt that Stokes is using psychoanalytic language here to enshrine Freud's dictum that '*Considerations of representability is the peculiar psychical material of which dreams make use*' — to quote Stokes's quotation from Freud in that same late essay.[73] In the following passage Newman seizes on the word 'philosophy' to vindicate his reading of *Venice: an Aspect of Art* as a form

of aesthetic philosophy rather than applied psychoanalysis:

> Giorgione's art is not the expression of a philosophical or mystical idea. On the contrary, by imbuing objects and their relation with aesthetic value he created a philosophy which I have affirmed to be relevant today.[74]

Newman has missed the force of Stokes's 'not' and 'on the contrary'. As the epitome of Venetian yearnings, Giorgione's landscapes embody a pragmatic, Aristotelian theory of man's relation to the world which anticipates the sanity promised by modern psychoanalysis. Philosophy *per se* is rejected because only art and psychoanalysis constitute 'philosophy . . . relevant today'.[75]

Newman wrongly concludes that Stokes avoids Freudian or Kleinean interpretation at this stage of his career,[76] for psychoanalytic meaning conditions the very structure through which Stokes's book refers to Venice. Take the apparently innocuous metaphors (immediately after Newman's quotation above) that introduce the 'Envoi' section on which *Venice* closes: 'I append the series of abstractions which these volumes have clothed.' The 'abstractions' turn out to be the principles of psychoanalysis that are about to be expounded in the final section of the book; 'these volumes' refer to the unfinished trilogy of *The Quattro Cento* and *Stones of Rimini*; while 'clothing' is the artistic equivalent to the dream-work through which descriptions of Venice in all these books manifest the latent thoughts of psychoanalysis itself.[77] Like Alberti's Renaissance encasement of the Gothic structure at the Tempio, or Ruskin's 'brickwork . . . clothed with . . . marble' at St Mark's, Stokes regards Venice as a physical garment clothing psycho-philosophical conceptions of relationship between Mind and World. This is the 'content to be ascribed to form that is lent to clothe the subject-matter (dream-thought)' of which Stokes would write to Lawrence Gowing in 1961. Long before Dickens entitled his chapter on Venice in *Pictures from Italy* (1846) simply 'An Italian Dream', indeed from the time of St Mark's founding dream of the basilica (which Stokes subjects to psychoanalytical interpretation on a later page of *Venice: an Aspect of Art*),[78] Venice had been regarded as a concrete manifestation of — and for — dreaming. Applying Freud to this tradition, Stokes promotes Giorgione's art as an 'interchange . . . between a deep-set wordless dream and an outward world'.[79]

'Wordless dream' alerts us to analogies with Freud's visual illustration of the political leading article in a newspaper. This is only one of the antinomies from 'Art Today' that are pursued into *Venice: an Aspect of Art* with remarkable rigour. Thus Venice escapes the Poundian polarity of past and present, for like 'the relaxed yet revolutionary art' of Giorgione, the 'father of modern painting', it is 'very traditional, yet very modern'.[80] Stokes therefore writes of Venice in terms that remember his analyses of Nicholson's and Hepworth's modern semi-abstract art, or he will refer to the illusion of a Venetian building being 'upside down' as if it were the painting whose accidental reversal inspired Kandinsky to the invention of abstract art, or he counters Futurist attacks on the bankruptcy of Venetian tradition by describing its ornament in Marinetti's terms as 'no less utilitarian than a racing motor-car'.[81]

But unlike modern poetry and painting, Venice is representational as well as abstract. Despite the formalism of its masonry: 'No abstraction in art has been more profound and more complete, but less circumscribing: witness the wealth of detail and of ornament it allows.'[82] Thus — as in 'Art Today' again — if Venice and the art of Giorgione are objective correlatives of the dream, they are so:

> . . . *not* in the sense that the landscape is a dream-landscape, a surrealist projection of the mind. That would be to deny the sensuous love of Nature and the fullness of affinity from which this poetry springs.[83]

Such affinity responds to the integrative and communicative rather than the censoring side of Freud's theory of dreams. It marks the recurrence of Freud's idea that dream-words are 'nodal points of numerous ideas', only this time it is the visual naturalism of Venetian ornament and Giorgione's landscapes instead of modern abstract art that serves as a 'concentrating reflector of the manifold spirit'.[84]

But if Stokes had merely translated the themes of 'Art Today' into the Venetian writings without developing and changing them, those writings would be duller than they are. The architecture in *Venice: an Aspect of Art* is classified according to neither sacred, secular, aristocratic, vernacular nor historical categories, but is nevertheless evaluated according to a clear hierarchy which grades buildings according to their aptitude merely to emulate the human body or, further, break through to representations of the inner mind. The 'plain physiology of ordinary building' is conjured up throughout the book in images of sense apparatus: respiration, sucking, eating, cardiovascular circulation, standing, walking, running, nerves, muscles, limbs, sheltering, washing, slapping, sleeping, dreaming, waking, giving or experiencing birth and, above all, eyes, eyesight and sexual intercourse.[85] Though Stokes's purchase on such metaphors is more disarmingly explicit than other writers of his time, they are ubiquitous not only in the classical corpus of architectural theory but also in the work of Ruskin and, more recently, Geoffrey Scott, who wrote in *The Architecture of Humanism* that:

> . . . art addresses us through immediate impressions rather than through the process of reflection, and this universal metaphor of the body, a language profoundly felt and universally understood, is its largest opportunity. A meta-

> phor is, by definition, the transcription of one thing into terms of another, and this in fact is what the theory under discussion claims. It claims that architectural art is the transcription of the body's states into forms of building.[86]

Stokes sees not just single buildings but the whole of Venice, as one walks along its circulating canals, either as the exterior or interior of a body that is nevertheless always outside us. The original stimulus for this idea could have been Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* to which Stokes had enthusiastically taken at Rugby School. We read from 'The Book of Machines':

> It is said by some that our blood is composed of infinite living agents which go up and down the highways and byways of our bodies as people in the streets of a city. When we look down from a high place upon crowded thoroughfares, is it possible not to think of corpuscles of blood travelling through veins and nourishing the heart of the town? No mention shall be made of sewers, nor of the hidden nerves which serve to communicate sensations from one part of the town's body to another; nor of the yawning jaws of the railway stations, whereby the circulation is carried directly into the heart, which receive the venous lines, and disgorge the arterial, with an eternal pulse of people. And the sleep of the town, how lifelike! with its changes in the circulation![87]

The highest category of Stokes's evaluation of Venetian buildings involves the subordination of mere bodily references to 'more ambitious building' in which the mind itself is externalized. 'Much more has been brought to the surface' because 'dark inner ferment' is exposed completely.[88]

Stokes's model for this more ambitious, mental criterion for Venice is Freud's magnificent analogy between the archaeology of Rome and the successive phases of the human mind in *Civilization and its Discontents*. The following short quotation, which lacks Freud's history of displaced architectural regimes, does little justice to the accumulative force of Freud's suggestive metaphor:

> Now let us, by a flight of imagination, suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past — an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one ... And the observer would perhaps only have to change the direction of his glance or his position in order to call up the one view or the other.[89]

Stokes wanted to believe that Renaissance Venice, as a synthesis of all previous architectural styles,[90] was somewhere that embodied this fantasy in actuality. From the façade of San Zaccaria:

> ... we obtain the impression of a vast community of individuals, of Venice herself and of the hive. For were we to come upon such a formation among rocks, ... we would say that the mass in honeycomb was an organic repository possessing a distinctness of each particle that suggests a gradual accumulation of encrusted material.[91]

Freud's imaginary alteration of the spectator's gaze and position to bring that lost totality back into view accounts for the 'spirality of mind' that G. Price-Jones jibed at in Stokes's writing. To achieve it required much more than simple description, for to write about Venice in the early twentieth century was both to rival its beauty and to be measured against a host of distinguished writers.[92] Shifts of angle are brought about by juxtaposing many authors' words within his own sentences. This is semiosis — the turbulence of interpretation — complementing semiotics — the structure of preordained meanings embedded in the artefact. He uses others' words to clothe the physical entity of Venice (place of aesthetic fantasy) instead of Rome (place of reason and religion) with the literary semblance of a many-sided simulacrum, a three-dimensional palimpsest of the human mind.

Stokes betrays the anxiety of influence behind this principle of intertextual writing in successive diary entries at Venice in May 1925. On the 6th: 'In my mind all the time is, of course, sex.' Continuing on the 9th:

> You expect me all the time to say something interesting about Venice? I think Ruskin must have been a eunuch although a great man. He lashes me daily, hurls at me stones of Venice.

His mood lightens on the 12th with the idea of a promiscuous literary conjunction: 'One might have rather fun by bringing Ruskin and Sachie [Sacheverell Sitwell] together.'

Apart from innumerable refractions in Stokes's prose of Ruskins's *Stones of Venice*, requiring too much explanation of Ruskin's work to be investigated here, Stokes's Venetian writings also echo Pater's 'School of Giorgione', D'Annunzio's *Il Fuoco*, and Pound's Venetian and Pisan Cantos. There are also sharp disavowals. Though Ruskin's 'unrivalled language' is directly, as well as indirectly, quoted, his praise of Gothic as the representative art of Venice is tartly condemned.[93] Likewise in *The Quattro Cento* the title of Thomas Mann's degenerate vision of the city is dismissed across the break of a sentence: 'Art, life and death must be close together; nowhere are they closer than in *Venice. Death in* the canals' (emphasis added).[94] But to achieve a verbal homology resonant enough to compete with Freud's visual encapsulation of the human psyche at Rome, Stokes needed to go beyond specific borrowings to the vast history of 'Common Sense' experience that Giambattista Vico traced back into the metaphors of everyday speech. Thus the 'abstractions' which Stokes clothes are Viconian as well as Freudian: 'Any metaphor is an interchange of meaning'; 'Each fresh composition uses anew the material of all previous structures'; 'To live

is to substitute. Art is the symbol of human process.'[95] At Venice we witness the verbal Viconian Image in visual Freudian Form, for both its churches and vernacular architecture are said to 'provoke . . . an image of the inner life; not *this* kind of inner life or *that* kind, but inner in the abstract in outer form'.[96] Although almost all the architectural members Stokes describes are implicitly gendered as circles or rectangles, material or form, Newman is largely right to suggest that Stokes avoids 'Freudian interpretation of *subject-matter* of specific art works' (emphasis added)[97] — but shows considerable determination in missing how vividly Stokes projects images of the unconscious into the *forms* of Venetian buildings. There are benign fantasies of sexual intercourse again, certainly, but still more the primal scene of originating parental coitus; processes of projection and introjection; contests between Eros and Thanatos; displacement, condensation, and dream representations; super-ego representations of harmony within the family, between cousins, siblings and parents, and above all the presiding harmony of the Kleinean mother. All these fantasies of psychoanalytic process feed the static drama of Stokes's Venetian encapsulations, even though, unlike Ruskin, there are signs of closure in which the wilder sexual fantasies of the earlier Venetian architecture are sublimated within Renaissance façades more symptomatic of the inhibited, middle-class, twentieth-century, male body (*hommo clausus*, in Norbert Elias's phrase) than the Renaissance citizen. Of the Byzantine façade of St Mark's, we hear for example that 'a vibrant, crested, wave-like movement . . . will simplify without loss into pillars and pilasters', yet outside this orthodox heterosexual scheme there are ghostly hints of homoerotic interest in the male humans frozen by the photographs. Stokes protests too much against subjectivity when he insists upon the 'femoral tourniquet pressure point' that a man's tie reaches down to on his body.[98]

Having appreciated, *pace* Newman, the extent to which Stokes's view of Venice depends directly and indirectly on Freud, we must now recognize that all these textual strategies on Stokes's part expressly negate the stated *purpose* of Freud's mentalized fantasy of Rome. Freud went on beyond the passage I quoted to destroy the vision he had conjured up. He did so because it constituted a false idol to the mind's inner history. Since 'the same space cannot have two different contents', and each phase of culture has all but demolished the architectural trappings of its predecessor, he argued that any attempt to visualize the unconscious is but 'an idle game' with 'only one justification. It shows us how far we are from mastering the characteristics of mental life by representing them in pictorial terms.'[99] Yet time and again in *Venice: an Aspect of Art* and other works, Stokes rebuilds the mentalized city that Freud tore down. In this he was repeating an earlier battle against infinite, invisible thinking.

Richard Wollheim records that in the early 1920s Stokes underwent 'a terrific rejection of philosophy'.[100] The rejection of Kant can be traced to his university notebooks:

> What Kant did not see was that if a conception like causality was phenomenal, then too must be its correlative freedom. They are inseparable. Yet however wrong may be the distinction of phenomena and noumena, the fact that he saw that it was necessary in spite of its difficulties, is Kant's greatest stroke of genius. He could only make the knowledge world coherent by driving the conceptions subject to the antinomies beyond it. Yet he was great enough to realize that these subjects of the antinomies were yet the Great Commonplaces of every day life and the spring of morality. They must somehow be brought back — but not within the knowledge world. Fundamentally he realized these two worlds — one of endless chains and subtle structures, the other the rough riding inspiration, the primitive end in itself.[101] Previous and subsequent philosophy have ever confused them — subsequent philosophy in its attempt to correct Kant's manifold errors. But sp [?] has lost sight of the true ground of his great distinction — not that there was ever a sight of it as Kant never made it explicit because he was never fully conscious of it himself. Current events made him seek to lay the emphasis elsewhere. It is a secret truth that drips out of him because he was the greatest. Here it was that he places his distinction in the wrong place. *He did not comprehend interdependence.* His freedom comes within the knowledge sphere although mystically it stands outside it as well.[102]

The sentence I have emphasized suggests that Kant's error was not only to have hived off noumena from the phenomenal world but not to have discovered Bradley's theory of Interdependence. The notebooks show Bradley to be in error also, however:

> Bradley's mistake is in thinking that a knowledge that all knowledge is conditional involves knowledge of the unconditional. The fact that we can say this is not ultimate does not involve necessarily a knowledge of what is ultimate. Even here we are attributing existence to the ultimate but we cannot help that. We are held in a circle of finite thought.[103]

Being 'held . . . by finite thought' eventually justified Stokes's abandonment of philosophical abstractions in favour of art criticism which did not depend, as Pater put it (against Ruskin), on the 'sensuous expression of ideas which unreservedly discredit the world of sense'.[104] In this respect Ruskin's spirituality, Bradley's Absolute and Freud's unpicturable history of the mind posed related problems to the ambitions of an aesthete intent upon enlarging the significance of finite visual representation. It is therefore not surprising that Stokes's rejection of philosophy coincided with the period when he was first 'bowled over' by another lapsed philosopher, Walter Pater.[105]

Yet as we have just seen, Stokes's negation of philosophy was nothing if not philosophical. It was in fact Bradley's

own arguments on language that persuaded Stokes to stop his own writing from making too much sense, for Bradley held that all words — not just adjectives — are a distortion of Reality that only the 'arts of suggestion' can overcome.[106] This prompted Stokes to drop the lucid expository writing of his undergraduate essays — full of the 'snap' that his Imperially minded tutors insisted on[107] — in favour of a style that depended at first upon incomprehensible Nietzschean metaphors,[108] but which afterwards became more concrete and oblique in its Paterian use of 'slight idiosyncratic *diversions* of words ... which effect rhythm so powerfully, by the slight shock they give to the understanding'.[109] Take the word 'warehouse' in the opening lines of *Venice: an Aspect of Art*: 'I saw today a great grey sail patched with white, a warehouse in fact on the Giudecca it looked: it moved away to reveal such a warehouse'.[110] As with words, so with visual representation: Bradley approached idealism backwards, so to speak, driven there by means no more positive than scepticism towards empiricism. Bradley's subversion of empiricism prevented Stokes from ever regarding visual representation as a simple copy of the real,[111] though in seeming recognition of Freud's refutation of the analogy between Rome and the unconscious mind, Stokes concludes a draft conclusion to *Venice: an Aspect of Art* with the otherwise strange profession: 'I, even more than most men, live by fantasy. But I do not mistake it for truth.'[112]

Paradoxically, negating Freud's ban on picturing mental life involved Stokes in a reaffirmation of philosophy. Thus when Stokes holds on in *Smooth and Rough* (1951) to the analogy that Freud had cancelled between the history of cities and the history of the Mind, he calls on Bradley to shore up his extension of the visual into the unconscious:

> ... we shall marvel at and reverence a huge structure above ground, storey upon storey of amplification, of development, of repetition in accordance with the foundation and lie of the land ... such will be the version, with an aesthetic tinge, of Appearance and the Thing-in-itself.[113]

If Bradley's mistake was to think he could have knowledge 'of the unconditional', then Freud's was to deny that 'finite thought' (in architectural terms) could extend to the furthest reaches of the mind so that — 'without hint at a further dynamic', as Stokes says of Santa Maria dei Miracoli at Venice — nothing interior is left.[114] We saw that it was Bradleyan idealism that inclined Stokes in 'Art Today' towards Freudian dream-theory as a catalyst for wider forms of integration instead of censorship. Since considerable adjustment between the psychoanalytical and the philosophical was required for Stokes to produce a satisfactory externalisation of the invisibly internal, we must conclude that the 'fit' between architecture and its aesthetic effect was not a natural or inevitable one.

The tortuous adjustments of current and discarded disciplines needed to arrive at the 'right' interpretation of Venetian architecture lend possible credence to Stephen Bann's argument that protracted attention to works of art serves only as an index 'of the way in which such an object as a painting obdurately resists interpretation (that is to say, an *adequate* interpretation)'.[115] On this reading the meaning of art might be completely inaccessible, but in my opinion the problem with Stokes's Venetian incarnations of 'Art Today' and 'The Image in Form' is their neglect of art's censorship function, their *partial* concealment of the meaning that nevertheless presses on them. The timeless Image of the integrated Ego blocks access to the battles that gave rise to Form. The satisfying fit between mental Image and physical Form stamps out the idiosyncracies of prior history. To illuminate this quandary through an extreme counter-example, Aby Warburg argued that contrasting features in the subject-matter of a work of art might be determined through but also beyond the agency of artist or patron by different facets of a period's 'mentality'.[116] Supplanting the artist's psyche as the exclusive model for the work of art's cohesion, this approach dissolves patterns of 'endophoric' cohesion within a work of art or architecture (the constancy of its structure as a history painting or classical temple) into 'exophoric' cohesion with the context in which it is produced (Géricault, for example, as 'product' of the French Revolution),[117] though psyche is reconstituted and writ large at the metalevel of this theory as schizophrenically divergent forces. This is no less detrimental to an understanding of the censorship function than the Image in Form, for it effaces the way in which art and architecture necessarily occlude the ideologies in which they are formed.

Agreeable as it might be to many artists, the doctrine of 'The Image in Form' posits visual structure that 'should be to some extent a strait-jacket in regard to the eventual images that it is most likely to induce'.[118] The authoritarianism of this 'strait-jacket' function is regularly heard in Stokes's language: 'No one, yes, no one looking at this picture could fail to feel a closer link between the figure and the landscape', he says of Giorgione's *Tempesta*.[119] This both occludes and embodies what John Barrell called the 'dark side' of the local, political and psychical processes by which images come about.[120] Freud's metaphor of Rome deployed an intensely political conception of mental development. Both Rome and the human Ego were places where successful regimes had all but obliterated their predecessors. Only in the Mind do vanquished residents continue their ghostly occupation in the place of their conquerors, but they do so in a manner that defeats visualization. Despite the semiosis which foregrounds Stokes's descriptions of Venice, what Jacqueline Rose called 'the key fantasies operating at the heart of institutions' are displaced by psycho-philosophical projections.[121] This is consistent with Eagleton's conception of 'The

ideology of the aesthetic', 'ruling and informing our sensuous life from within while allowing it to thrive in all its relative autonomy'.[122] The effect of Stokes' evocations of Venice is one that reifies the political and aestheticizes the unconscious. Though incomparably greater as writing, it could not be further from the 'witches of the night' who 'ride on broomsticks and converse with the powers of darkness in Klein's work'.[123] It is a 'culture-as-substance' view that, were it not for the liveliness of the insights, would reduce Venice to the visual equivalent of Eliot's or Leavis's 'Tradition'.[124]

Is there, then, a hidden 'dark side' to Stokes's view of Venice? I shall answer with a final resemblance between 'Art Today' and the Venetian writings and a negation through which Pound regains a brief ascendancy in Stokes's work. But we must start with the political connotations of Venice in Victorian aesthetics.

From *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* onwards, Ruskin had assumed that architecture is an index of the morals of its age. In 'The Two Boyhoods' chapter of *Modern Painters V*, he insisted on the innocence and strength that enabled Giorgione to play his rightful part in the collective religious aims of the Venetian community. His art could no more help revealing the ethical purity of the city than Turner's could conceal the Godless depravity of modern London. Pater, likewise, regards Giorgione as 'a sort of impersonation of Venice itself, its projected reflex or ideal, all that was intense or desirable in it crystallising about the memory of this wonderful young man'.[125] It turns out, however, that Pater regards Giorgione as a reflex or ideal of Venetian art and architecture, not at all of Venetian society. Far from accepting Ruskin's discontinuous view of history in which Giorgione's moral world is irretrievably remote from our own, Pater suggests that we can project ourselves into Giorgione's world through contemplation of his art. Simultaneously, however, Pater transforms Giorgione's social context from one assumed by Ruskin, in which 'the idea of the passing away of the strength of men and beauty of their works never could occur to him sternly', to 'a civilization rapidly changing'.[126] Ruskin assumed that Giorgione's work adequately reflects a 'world from which all ignoble care and petty thoughts were banished, with all the common and poor elements of life',[127] but Pater extracts Giorgione from this sense of social solidarity. The school of Giorgione selects its ideal instant with 'admirable tact, from that feverish, tumultuously coloured world of the old citizens of Venice'.[128] Whereas Ruskin had assumed a benign reflection of a wholesome city state in Giorgione's art, Pater regards that art as straining in élitist revulsion away from a chaotic and contemptible society. It is with the purpose of disarticulating and hypostatizing the moral tendentiousness of Ruskin's Venetian narratives that Pater chooses to regard the productions of the School of Giorgione as illustrative of 'a sort of poetry which tells itself without an articulated story'.

Not only does this phrase form the core of Stokes's representational opposition to Pound's abstractionism in the modern art–poetry arguments of 'Art Today',[129] it led to a reassessment of Pater (modified by Bradley) against Pound in the preparatory notebooks for *Venice: an Aspect of Art*:

> According to Pater, the basic aim and value of art is in the putting of subject-matter into terms of the abstract values. Lending abstract value to the subject, infusing it with a unifying principle, and hence a poetry . . .[130]

This was written in his notebooks for 1938, the year of his final meeting with Pound. Another entry from September of the same year provides a fascinating insight into his rejection of Pound's Fascism on the same grounds that Pater rejected Ruskin's art criticism: narrative coerciveness.

The entry entitled 'After visiting Turin art picture gallery' is impossible to understand without appreciating how tenaciously Stokes holds on in private thinking to the verbal–visual arguments of 'Art Today':

> How colossal the atmosphere of these colossal Bassanos and Veroneses: what strength, what vitality, what myth. It is the whole interest of these forms. Perhaps it is one of the awful ultimate truths that the literary interest in painting is basically right. The anecdote in a picture would not be even of the most popular interest were it not so vital in the whole aesthetic content.
>
> One renounces the misguided heroic cause, Fascism for instance, not because there is anything more stirring today or tomorrow, but because to renounce it, and all the strength and discipline it may afford, is the first weary step to a heroism less misguided, less destructive. You read on the walls of Italy 'All national supremacy has had to be fought for.' Ah yes. We are machines, but none the less do not let us be heroic. Ezra cannot wait, cannot make the one important renunciation of today, belief in the devil as well as of God. For him, bankers and Jews are the devil. And so *he* ends up thus, an intellectual if you please, crying 'The "reds" (in Spain) are bankers and Jews' or 'Bankers and Jews are "reds".'

On one level this is a straightforward rejection of Pound's Fascist 'literary interest' in favour of the hard-earned truths of psychoanalysis ('the first weary step to a heroism less misguided'). Hugh Kenner was therefore wrong to form the sour impression from an interview in the 1960s that Stokes 'didn't want to be connected with E. P., perhaps less because of E. P.'s political involvement than because of his own Freudian faith'.[131] The diary entry shows that, on the contrary, Freudian faith and the political rejection of Fascism were inextricably connected in Stokes's thinking about literature and painting. We have seen that this was the year that he moved the antinomy of poetry and visual abstraction over to Pater from Pound. The antinomy recurs in constant slippages throughout our

passage: from anecdote and literary interest to the 'whole aesthetic content' of painted myths to the misguided heroism of Pound's and Italy's Fascism.

The implication is that Fascism considered as a literary myth is aesthetically stirring but riddled with manic and erroneous oppositions between God and the devil: Fascists on the one hand, bankers, Jews and Communists on the other. Opposed to this, 'the first weary step to a heroism less misguided' must be read not only as the hard-earned truths of psychoanalysis, but as a humbler and ultimately more coherent 'literary content'. What remains intact from 'Art Today' is the relevance of literature to the aesthetic effects of visual art (in this case Bassano's and Veronese's). In freeing himself from Pound's religious faith in Fascist narratives at Turin in 1938, one wonders whether Stokes remembered that Ruskin's religious 'unconversion' took place eighty years later in the same city after seeing Veronese's sensuous *Soloman and the Queen of Sheba* and attending the sermon of a bigoted Protestant preacher.

By the time *Venice: an Aspect of Art* was published seven years later, everything had changed. I have argued elsewhere that the period coincided with a recrudescence of Stokes's Poundian Fascism abandoned after 1931.[132] In one sense Stokes's view of Venice is the ancient one that Venice had itself promoted as a place of benign freedom secured by the political endurance of its aristocracy. The contrast in his work between Venice as a place of stasis and Florence as a place of flux reached Stokes through Burckhardt, but originates in the Renaissance humanists (for example, Poggio) who, at a time of crisis due to imminent invasion, were the first to turn Venice into a politically strategic myth of natural beauty, personal liberty and political endurance.[133] Unwittingly susceptible to the 'strait-jacket' of this ancient, politically contrived image of Venice, it becomes Stokes's maternal version of Venice as a liberal home environment.[134]

But in another version the paternal super-ego takes over from the maternal and, like Pater's revulsion from the 'feverish, tumultuously coloured world of the old citizens', Venice is emptied of her population as if a neutron bomb had preserved nothing but its architecture: 'Venice inspires a sense of affinity . . . but not the population. They appear matchstick-like, out of place'.[135] 'Social intercourse' in Venice is 'uneconomic',[136] Stokes finds, but not so trade itself. Here is a further sense to that recurring word 'commerce'. In earlier works Stokes had appreciated the Roman Empire for its foundation upon 'free trade and other ruthless but practical doctrines', and regarded Venetian palaces as 'the hoard of ancient Venetian enterprise'.[137] In *Venice: an Aspect of Art* the Freudian analogy with Rome is applied to the 'high-piled intercourse and commerce' of medieval Venice.[138] Crude though it might seem to suggest that this reflects the trading acumen of Stokes's stockbroking father, on which his own art criticism depended, the inference is supported by other aspects of the book.

The very unity of Venice's many-levelled ego turns out to be fiercely oligarchical, patriarchal and authoritarian. For all that 'Venice is a potent symbol of the mother' through the enveloping circulation of its canals and tolerant conditions of its citizens, its 'internal unity' depended upon a single political system, not the rich mixture of political representation that was usually offered as the reason for success:

> It is not surprising, therefore, to find that it worked, that is, the oligarchical Venetian government: worked with more public spirit than did any other large political organization of those centuries; and lasted longer . . . Elsewhere political sagacity has not earned such success: no other statesmen have seen so far ahead: and by means of the supreme realism of correct prognostication, Imperial Venice perpetuated herself, artifically as it were, for some two hundred years after her needful death.[139]

Like his aesthetics, Stokes's early politics were informed by Bradley's theory of Interdependence and so riven by paradox. An unpublished essay on 'The Profundity of Liberalism' formulates liberalism as the solution to the conflict between the individuality of Conservatism and the collectivity of Socialism.[140] Stokes's father, Durham, had stood as a candidate for the Liberal and Labour party at Stepney in the General Election of 1906. In a philosophical tract implicitly devoted to his son and published at his own expense in 1929, Durham reflects ideas made popular amongst the British middle classes by Maeterlinck and other National Efficiency authors to the effect that 'as far as certain insects are concerned, it appears obvious that their social efficiency is incredibly increased by their entire subordination to the Spirit of the Hive'.[141] Citing 'the spirit of the Renaissance', Durham argues that '"the Spirit of the Hive" would not only check, but would stimulate enormously the individual efforts of artists and other distinguished men',[142] though he proceeds radically to qualify this concept of collective subordination with an autocratic notion popular with both Fabians and Conservatives within the middle classes of the day:

> If this transition should take place, it will probably be brought about in the first place by the personal example of some small body of men. H. G. Wells in one of his recent books outlined the idea that the Government of the world would have to be carried on, sooner or later, by a small class of Samurai, men who were neither influenced by the desire of money or personal distinction.[143]

As a self-made businessman, albeit failed politician, Durham clearly thought of himself in this light.

Against the authoritarian impersonality of this hard-nosed liberalism, and the global outlook of a stockbroker on the world share market, Adrian Stokes reactively

embraced the collective individuality of liberal *humanism* in a pre-Modernist setting of the Mediterranean. The 'vast community of individuals' that Stokes traces up the Freudian tiers of San Zaccaria evokes this precisely, but he also compares that façade to 'the hive' and 'honeycomb' of Venice itself. There is a mismatch between the paternal and maternal imagos of Venice. Given his Paterian aversion to the actual population of Venice, given that 'On the water, swimming or in a small boat, we are the insects, the may-flies buoyant', given also the 'inequality of the pillars' of St Mark's resembling the metaphors of social inequality he elsewhere sees in chimney pots, given further the processions of 'ephor-like doges', and the combined aspect of Palladian church and state Customs House that 'administer', aesthetically, 'the flexible waters',[144] the political contradictions of Stokes's Venice reflect the paradoxes of Edwardian society far more than those of Renaissance Venice.

Here we approach the final resemblance between the Venetian writings and 'Art Today'. Stokes had written in his earliest book that the 'really great man is an embodiment of the "Ultimate Relation" . . . ever bringing one thing against another — unprepossessed'.[145] In the person of Giorgione we find a curious synthesis of all the possible systems of artistic patronage outlined in 'Art Today'. Whereas in 'Art Today' the autonomy of modern artists is distinguished from 'the dictation of State or Church', in *Venice: an Aspect of Art*, the '"taking up" of an artist . . . was something new in Venice where, more than in other Italian centres, painting had hitherto been regarded as a perequisite of Church and state'.[146] Just as the Renaissance artist of *The Quattro Cento* benefits from the 'more individual aesthetic' that is 'imposed upon him . . . by the miraculous clarity . . . of a princely patron', so it is in *Venice*, for it was only in Giorgione's time 'that potentates demanding expression of their fancies' came about. Giorgione, therefore, in the manner of Agostino at Rimini, 'was patronized by a handful of aristocratic collectors' so that his 'art may truly have been an expression of his patron's fancies'. But Vasari's stories 'suggest a personality as well as an artist'. As 'the father of modern painting',[147] Giorgione resembles the modern artist of 'Art Today' whose 'selective process has become conscious and personal'. In *Venice*, indeed, Giorgione's personality 'may have created this demand' from patrons 'who identified themselves with him as far as there was influence at all'.[148] In respect of patronage Giorgione is like Pater's Leonardo — 'the embodiment of the old fancy, the symbol of the modern idea'[149] — a symbolically over-extended, finally confusing 'Ultimate Relation'.

At a time when Pound was endowing his *Pisan Cantos* with an unstable mix of political contrition and defiance while standing trial in America for broadcasts on Mussolini's radio,[150] the political complexion of Stokes's Venice is similarly unstable. Since Renaissance Venice had never been a democracy, it may not have been historically inaccurate to praise the sagacity of its 'oligarchical government', but at a time when 'hundreds of British men and women' were 'deservedly enjoying themselves' at Venice on account of the victory of democracy over Fascism, it was arguably imprudent of Stokes to publish such views.[151] It is also telling that this most political of passages was expanded from his notebooks of 1931 when his Fascist sympathies for Pound were at their strongest:

> It worked; that is, the oligarchical Venetian government: worked better than has any other political institution of which we know. No city, no country with a quarter as long as [sic] a history has approached the internal unity of Venice; no devotion to the state, no public service, no loyality can be recorded elsewhere.[152]

Having negated his negation of Bradley and negated his affirmation of Freud, Stokes is now negating his negation of Pound, who returns in the natural imagery of 'static cave-like depth', 'flambeaux', 'bird cries' that 'slip across the shallows' and 'beautiful oxen' along 'white roads', imagery belonging as much to the politically ambivalent Pisan Cantos as the earlier ones.[153] Despite his claims for Venice's combined modernity and traditionalism, Stokes's Venice reflects nothing of amorphous urban experience. Though it is still possible to experience Venice in Stokes's terms, it is partly its cleanliness as a tourist city that enables us to do so. A reading of such different recent works as John Premble's *Venice Rediscovered* and Richard Goy's *Venetian Vernacular Architecture* helps to shake social and historical reality back into the idealism of Stokes's vision of Venice as a vacant solid.[154] At one point Stokes speaks of the *Tempesta* as 'the old frightening home revisited in maturity'.[155] What else but a manic idealization of despondency left behind are we to make of Stokes's Venice? Strangely enough, this seems to have been Melanie Klein's view.

Many commentators have suggested that Stokes's faith in psychoanalysis perpetuated the fanaticism which he felt he had rejected in philosophy.[156] Both in its Freudian and Kleinean forms, psychoanalysis became itself a structure for guidance and dependency, like a physical work of art or a foreign city. Klein's theories invited this reliance by producing 'something as intractable, as creatively unmasterable, as what many readers have become accustomed to discovering in Freud'.[157] At the same time, in the early stages of his analysis, Klein criticized the escapism of Stokes's attachment to foreign cities, regarding it as a symptom of his psychological illnesses:

> In a contrast to his native town which he thought of as a dark, lifeless and ruined place in spite of the fact — or because of the fact, as his analysis showed — that there was a lot of traffic there (i.e. continual copulation between his

> father and mother), he pictured an imaginary city full of life, light and beauty, and sometimes found his vision realized, though only for a short time in the cities he visited in other countries. This far-off visionary city represented his mother once more made whole and reawakened to a new life, and also his own restored body. But the excess of his anxiety made him feel that a restoration of this kind could not be accomplished, and this, too, was the cause of his inhibition in work.[158]

There is no doubt whatsoever that Klein is referring to Stokes here, and no one who has read Stokes's *Inside Out: a Study in the Aesthetic and Psychological Appeal of Space* (1947) will fail to recognize this passage as a premonition, fifteen years before the fact, of the brilliant autobiographical contrast between his negative experience of London and his positive experience of Italy. Yet as with Freud's cancelled analogy between Rome and the Mind, Stokes uses Klein's imagery (which presumably he gave her) without accepting her interpretations. Is there not a persistence of compensatory idealism in the 'conspiracy abroad of universal triumph informing even the roads, the pavements and the harshest stucco' that greets him on his autobiographical escape from England to Italy in *Inside Out*?[159] As he seems to admit in the 'Envoi' to *Venice*: 'It may be found that the belief or trust in the good object inside . . . entails some degree of aversion from reality.'[160] His democratizing caveat in *Venice* that 'The ruling classes, however luxurious, could at no time isolate themselves from communal life',[161] would not seem to apply to isolationist visitors to Venice.

But there is also a sense in which Stokes's writings can be read 'inside out', in which the allegedly objective perfections of Venice, like an inverted form of narcissism, provide a real index of what was wrong in Stokes's psychosocial world,[162] while the miasmic evocations of his bleak Hyde Park playground, by contrast — 'the first conscious idea of "me" . . . largely coloured by painful associations'[163] — are far more resonant of a complex emergent self-confronting unpremeditated actuality:

> In summer there was the clipping and a branding and a dip, down near the police station. The startled shorn bodies suggested a touch of extreme 'nature', a nakedness, an exhibitionism, even, a sudden production of the pale body, a child's amorous game, a suicide, a thousand little boys running nude into the Serpentine on a hot summer evening, allied somehow with the world of correctitude, railings and park-keepers; with parkees and violent dirt, no less.[164]

It is in such a passage that censorship and idealization appears to lift. It is also where one feels the power of the Kleinean suggestion that:

> . . . feeling itself is simile ('feel "*like* death"'), that the most severe anxiety the child can feel opens up the path of indirect representation by putting it at a fundament, at *the* most fundamental, remove from itself.[165]

The moment need not always be a pessimistic one to feel the productive negativity of indirect representation (rather than perfect 'fit') in Stokes's visual semantics: 'a figure carved in stone is fine carving when one feels that not the figure, but the stone through the medium of the figure, has come to life', he wrote in *Stones of Rimini*.[166] Such an attitude 'partakes of the universal' in a 'more humble, less destructive' way than Newman allows for in his triumphalist, monodisciplinary account of Stokes's work.[167]

NOTES

1 – Michael O'Toole, *The Language of Displayed Art* (London, 1994), p. 215.

2 – Geoffrey Newman, 'Adrian Stokes and Venice', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 35/1 (1995), pp. 257 and 260.

3 – Take a passage that Newman quotes from *Venice: an Aspect of Art* in *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, ed. Lawrence Gowing, 3 vols (London, 1978), vol. 2, p. 120: 'Istrian stone is nearly always the boundary as well as the relevant mark upon the wall; not a writing on the wall but seemingly the nerve and muscle and the limbs of structure'. Through this can be heard Ruskin on St Mark's in *The Stones of Venice*, *The Works of John Ruskin*, eds. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn, 39 vols (London, 1903–12), vol. 10, pp. 98–9: 'Once understand . . . that this under muscular power of brickwork is to be clothed with the defence of the brightness of marble, as the body of an animal is protected and adorned by its scales or its skin, and all the consequent fitnesses and law of the structure will be easily discernible . . .'. Through this, in turn, we hear Plato's definition in *Phaedrus*, *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, eds Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York, 1961), p. 511, of one of two procedures in rhetoric 'whereby we are enabled to divide into forms, following the objective articulation; we are not to attempt to hack off parts like a clumsy butcher'. This is part of what I mean by Stokes's neo-neo-classicism and what Stokes means by his primary aesthetic category of Carving as opposed to Modelling.

4 – G. Price-Jones, review of *Colour and Form* by Adrian Stokes, *Burlington Magazine*, 72 (1938), p. 150.

5 – Anon. [Nikolas Pevsner], 'Stones of Venice: a post-Ruskinian rhapsody', *Times Literary Supplement*, no. 2279 (6 October 1945), p. 474.

6 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 74.

7 – Newman, 'Adrian Stokes and Venice', pp. 255 and 260.

8 – Anthony Blunt, 'Quattro Cento', *Spectator*, 30 July 1932, p. 162.

9 – See Stokes's ambivalent obituary, 'Herbert Read', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 4/3 (1964), p. 195: 'Should some of these theories turn out to be fugitive, should they contain "rationalizations" in the sense of the term as it is used by psychologists, the central or poetic vision which inspired them, which was incorporated, and perhaps could be embodied only thus, would remain.'

10 – Editorial footnote on W. H. Auden, 'In praise of limestone' in 'Modern British Literature', edited by Frank Kermode and John Hollander, *The Oxford Anthology of English Literature* (New York, 1973), p. 2109 n.

11 – For Roger Fry's domination of art critical language in England at this time, see Stella K. Tillyard, *The Impact of Modernism, 1900–1920: Early Modernism and the Arts and Crafts Movement in Edwardian England* (London and New York, 1988).

12 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, pp. 305–6.

13 – See particularly Adrian Stokes, *Colour and Form* (1937), *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, passim. For English modernist antipathy to Surrealism and the different foundations of its own absurdism, see Jacques Berthoud, 'Literature and drama', in *Early Twentieth-Century Britain: the Cambridge Cultural History of Britain*, ed. Boris Ford, vol. 8, p. 92.

14 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, pp. 305–6.
15 – Ibid., p. 116.
16 – Ibid., pp. 115–16.
17 – E. M. Forster, 'Anonymity: an enquiry' (1925), *Two Cheers for Democracy* (London, 1972), pp. 82–3.
18 – Adrian Stokes, *Sunrise in the West: a Modern Interpretation of Past and Present* (London, 1926), pp. 138–9. The anonymous function of the creative personality is, as Forster and Stokes define it, an unspoken point of agreement between warring aesthetic, psychological *and* literary approaches: all conspire to de-politicize the unconscious by disengaging it from historical circumstances. As Forster continues ('Anonymity: an enquiry', p. 83): 'As it came from the depths, so it soars to the heights, out of local questionings . . .'. Foster's argument may indirectly derive from the polarity of modernity and the eternity of classical beauty in Baudelaire's (similarly depoliticized) 'The painter of modern life'.
19 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, pp. 305–6.
20 – Ibid., p. 41.
21 – For an analysis of Stokes's use in *The Quattro Centro* of Pound's distinction between Cavalcanti's 'emblem' and Petrach's 'ornament', see my 'Art criticism versus poetry: an introduction to Adrian Stokes's "Pisanello" ', *Comparative Criticism*, 17 (1995), pp. 135–6.
22 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, p. 115.
23 – I. A. Richards, *Principles of Literary Criticism*, 2nd edn (London, 1926), p. 29.
24 – Ezra Pound writes in 'Mediaevalism and Mediaevalism (*Guido Cavalcanti*)', *The Dial*, 84, (1928), p. 235, that: 'In the case of the statue of the Etruscan Apollo at Villa Giulia (Rome) the "god is inside," but the psychology is merely that of an hallowe'en pumpkin.' Roger Fry castigates Leonardo da Vinci in 'The art of Florence', *Vision and Design* (1920), ed. J. B. Bullen (London, New York, Toronto, and Melbourne, 1981), p. 128, as follows: 'In the end almost everything was subordinated to the idea of a kind of psychological illustration of dramatic themes — an illustration which was not to be arrived at by an instinctive reconstruction from within, but by deliberate analytic observation.'
25 – See Hayden B. J. Maginnis, 'Painting and fiction' in 'Reflections on formalism: the post-Impressionists and the early Italians', *Art History*, 19/2 (1996), pp. 202–3: 'From Impressionism onwards, the visual arts were emptied of much traditional content . . . High art, serious art, became a thing of landscapes, still-lifes, portraits and eventually of abstractions and non-objective shapes . . . the notion of morality, self-identity, self-deception and indifferent fate embodied in . . . novels stood in stark contrast to a world of mountains and apples, sunflowers and bathers, places of pleasure, and embodiments of vice. The prevalence of the psychological novel indexed the much more complex and troubled relationship of individuals to self and society, and the discrepancy between painting and fiction was, perhaps, all the greater for the fact that the new literature often left us with vividly telling images, images that summarized or turned entire lives . . . Painting would not, because it could not, attempt such themes, images that derived their meaning from the temporal flow of prose. More importantly, painting had abandoned such ambitions.' This is something of an overstatement in view of Clive Bell's reflections on *A la recherche du temps perdu* and modern painting in *Proust* (London, 1928), p. 37: 'Because one time mass stands before another in the composition it does not follow that it precedes it in history; for, like the modern painter dealing with space-masses, Proust moves his hither and thither regardless of their chronological relations.' Likewise, to characterize the visual dimension of modern novelists, particularly Proust, Stokes resorted to surprisingly Surrealist imagery in *Sunrise in the West*, p. 93: 'Having stretched distinction beyond its breaking point, we are now justified in *accepting* the events of the day as part of a woven experience, daddy-longlegs embroidered with bathroom taps. This is the attitude of modern novelists as they uncover the subtle interconnections of significance, madeira cake and guiltiness, green bottles and penguins.' For links between psychology and the novel in Stokes's writings, see *The Thread of Ariadne*, intro. John Middleton Murry (London, 1925), p. 175: 'Have been reading "Jacob's Room." Some very good moments. In these modern novels there is so much more depth and penetration into psychology.' For praise of D. H. Lawrence for plunging 'with greater spirit into the bitter seas of modern consciousness than does any other writer', see *Sunrise in the West*, pp. 132–5 and n. (see also n. 102, below). Though Pound's poetry gave him the more immediate analogy for visual art, Stokes was also fixated by the novels of Conrad and Woolf's painter-novel *To the Lighthouse* from which many passages echo through his work.
26 – Lawrence Gowing, introduction, *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, p. 10.
27 – Peter Nicholls, 'Divergences: modernism, postmodernism, Jameson and Lyotard', *Critical Quarterly*, 33/3 (1991), p. 10.
28 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, p. 306.
29 – For 'afterthought' as a pejorative term in Stokes's earlier aesthetic, see ibid. pp. 63 and 135.
30 – Sigmund Freud, *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London, 1953–1975), vol. 19, p. 21.
31 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, p. 290.
32 – *Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 19, p. 21.
33 – In an unpublished document of the mid 1920s that I cannot now locate, Stokes wrote that the only people who resemble characters in novels are those who have just been reading them.
34 – Adrian Stokes, 'Collages' (1967), *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 3, p. 323.
35 – *Psychological Writings of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 5, pp. 339–40.
36 – Ibid, pp. 340–1.
37 – *The Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, p. 305.
38 – Stokes is responding to Lawrence Gowing, 'Mind the paintwork', review of Werner Haftmann, *Painting in the Twentieth Century*, *New Statesman*, 62 (1961), p. 224, whose key paragraph clearly emulates Freud's section on 'The Dream-Work': 'Any book that ranges as widely as this is bound to emphasise what is common, the public rationalisation against what is private and compulsive. It has to assume that we knew that it was not his taste or philosophy that drove an artist the way he had to go, that a picture is the sign of an absolutely personal and tightly-wrapped package of psychic purposes, like a joke or a dream. It is the product of a process that one had better (on the analogy of the dream-work and the joke-work of Freud or *his* excellent translator) call the *paint-work*, rather than overlook it altogether. No picture is autonomous. It is ruled by its maker and serves his purpose. It depends on him and if he depends also on it the feed-back goes into operation and a painter is in business. It is the paint-work that is autonomous and always has been.' The remainder of the letter I am quoting from Stokes will tartly qualify the degree of (Bloomsbury?) autonomy Gowing insisted on here. Nevertheless, in 1978 Gowing forgot Stokes's debt to Freud's dream theory when he criticizes, in a passage we have seen, Stokes's literary interpretation of abstract art in 'Art Today'.
39 – See Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, *Psychological Writings of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 7, p. 156: 'The progressive concealment of the body which goes along with civilization keeps sexual curiosity awake. This curiosity seeks to complete the sexual object by revealing its hidden parts. It can, however, be diverted ("sublimated") in the direction of art, if its interests can be shifted away from the genitals on to the shape of the body as a whole.'
40 – Ezra Pound, *Gaudier-Brzeska: a Memoir* ([1917] London: Laidlaw & Laidlaw, n. d.), pp. 100–4.
41 – Linda Dowling, *Hellenism and Homosexuality in Victorian Oxford* (Ithaca and London, 1994), p. 118.

42 – Stokes's '=' might also be a memory of Pound's most cogent definitions of the difference between poetry and prose in 'Henry James', *The Literary Essays of Ezra Pound*, ed. by T. S. Eliot (London, 1960), p. 324, n. 1: 'Poetry = Emotional synthesis, quite as real, quite as realist as any prose (or intellectual) analysis.'

43 – The fact that Stokes *refrained* from sending this evaluation of Pound in his reply to a letter of enquiry from Donald Davie (preferring instead the diplomatic formula 'I'm not "up" in the Cantos') was presumably because it revealed his negative view too clearly.

44 – See my analysis of this Nietzschean opposition in 'Art criticism versus poetry', pp. 145–6.

45 – *Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 4, p. 340.

46 – 'Collages', *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 3, p. 315. In so far as Pound uses Freud against Kandinsky, Stokes will wholeheartedly endorse him in *Colour and Form*, though not without discrediting Kandinsky. See *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 62: 'I am not particularly interested in colours *qua* colours; and the diaphanous mysticism to which such pseudo-studies (for only film colours can be isolated from form) lend themselves, are on the whole repulsive to me. Colours in themselves, since they are different wave-lengths, different parts of light, may promote definite physiological reactions; but, isolated from form, sensation of colour does not lead to a pure art of colours, or to anything that can be called an art. A system of colour harmonies based upon equal intervals as invented by Ostwald is interesting: the colours are harmonious, but less so than common chords played upon the piano.'

47 – John Carey, *The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary Intelligentsia 1880–1939* (London and Boston, 1992), pp. 33–4.

48 – The relevant passage in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, *Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 4, p. 319, which should be compared with Pound's poem for complex parallels, is this one: 'the dreamer saw herself climbing down over some palisades holding a blossoming branch in her hand. In connection with this image she thought of the angel holding a spray of lilies in pictures of the Annunciation — her own name was Maria — and of girls in white robes walking in Corpus Christi processions, when the streets are decorated with green branches. Thus the blossoming branch in the dream without any doubt alluded to sexual innocence. However, the branch was covered with *red* flowers, each of which was like a camellia. By the end of her walk — so the dream went on — the blossoms were already a good deal faded. There then followed some unmistakable allusions to menstruation. Accordingly, the same branch which was carried like a lily and as though by an innocent girl was at the same time an allusion to the *Dame aux camélias* who, as we know, usually wore a white camellia, except during her periods, when she wore a red one. The same blossoming branch (cf. 'des Mädchens Blüten' ['the maiden's blossoms'] in Goethe's poem 'Der Mülleren Verrat') represented both sexual innocence and its contrary. And the same dream which expressed her joy at having succeeded in passing through life immaculately gave one glimpses at certain points (e.g. in the fading of the blossoms) of the contrary train of ideas — of her having been guilty of various sins against sexual purity (in her childhood, that is). In analysing the dream it was possible clearly to distinguish the two trains of thought, of which the consoling one seemed the more superficial and the self-reproachful one the deeper-lying — trains of thought which were diametrically opposed to each other but whose similar though contrary elements were represented by the same elements in the manifest dream.'

49 – Adrian Stokes, 'Visit postponed (1926)', *With All the Views: the Collected Poems of Adrian Stokes*, ed. Peter Robinson (Manchester, 1981), p. 86.

50 – The cult is discussed at length in Lawrence S. Rainey, *Ezra Pound and the Monument of Culture: Text, History, and the Malatesta Cantos* (Chicago and London, 1991).

51 – To gloss the poem further, windy weather conditions at the start of the first verse may be symptomatic of Stokes's boredom with Pound's impetuous speech:

> Scirocco with wave weariness
> Harass predicaments on shore

The wind underscores the architectural eclecticism of Pound's street of residence (via Marsala) in ways that may evoke the confused, unstable and perhaps masturbatory ('flapping') nature of the poet's own architectural tastes, resulting in an extrusion of hard, geometrical Romanesque — which Stokes approves of — into the pejorative fluidity of *Jugendstil* — an ironic enactment of Pound's anti-semitism (though Stokes was half-Jewish, he was prone to anti-semitism):

> Narrow air
> Flaps via Marsala
> Romanesque into *Jugendstil.*

In the second verse the poet is grandiloquently identified through Eliot's dedication to the *Wasteland: 'Il miglior fabbro'*. The accolade is immediately qualified, however, by a bureaucratically banal reference to Pound's American work ethic and publicity machine which, through the street name, may also be a criticism of megalomaniac Italian politics: 'Busy as the Post Office/On via Garibaldi'. After the lines I have discussed in the text, the last two lines of the poem contain a complex suggestion:

> To creep will not impede
> Damp stairs' stone-fed echo.

Having failed to be converted to Pound's poetic cult, he turns on the stair to postpone the visit without alerting his host (though the word 'creep' also implies sycophantic evasions in ways akin to Eliot's staircase poem 'The Love Song of Alfred J. Prufrock'), and hears instead the sounds of his own more sustaining creed of stone and water ('Damp stair's stone-fed echo'). The symmetries of his own three verses and the emotional resolution of the whole poem implicitly contest the formal aberrations of the Cantos. Though these lines do not rhyme, it is significant for his own late practice as a poet that he deliberately and persistently kept himself within range of conventional poetic usage by consulting Robin Skelton's *Practice of Poetry* (London, 1971). See also Stokes's late poem 'On a Station Platform', *With All the Views*, p. 175, which answers Pound's 'In a Station of the Metro' with associations of objectifying connectedness and wholesome psychoanalytical recollection.

52 – Giambattista Vico claimed in *The New Science*, trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca and New York, 1948), pp. 107–8, 'that it was deficiency of human reasoning power that gave rise to poetry so sublime that the philosophies which came afterward . . . have produced none equal or better'. In view of the connection which Stokes makes between Pound's 'friskiness' and conceptual incoherence, see also *The Cantos of Ezra Pound* (London, 1975), p. 441: 'philosophy is not for young men'.

53 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, p. 41. Stokes's preference for representation at this time is confirmed in 'Pisanello: first of four essays on the Tempio Malatestiano at Rimini', ed. Richard Read, *Comparative Criticism*, 17 (1995), p. 172.

54 – For example Adrian Stokes, 'Concerning art and metapsychology', *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, 26 (1945), p. 178: 'a phantasy that has been detached from its originator to become an object, as if he were able to make of his mind a stone which yet displays and manifests the contents of his mind'.

55 – The quandary was ancient, at least, in the sense that the primary goal of Renaissance history painting was to imitate the virtuous actions of a noble soul; see R. W. Lee, *Ut pictura poesis: la teoria umanistica della pittura* (Florence, 1974), passim.

56 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 3, pp. 332–3. For a general commentary on Stokes's late ideas on representation, see Peter Leech, 'Aesthetic representations of mind: the critical writings of Adrian Stokes', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 19 (1979), pp. 76–80.
57 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 3, p. 333.
58 – Ibid., p. 336. A reading of Freud's 'Conditions of representability' that in certain respects comes close to Stokes's thesis in 'The Image in Form' may be found in Jean-François Lyotard, 'The dream-work does not think', *The Lyotard Reader* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 30–2. Stokes, however, would not have wished to banish thought from aesthetic 'encounter' so completely as Lyotard because contemplation in its Kantian sense was too important to him.
59 – For 'homology' between semiotic systems of writing and imaging, see Michael O'Toole, 'A systemic-functional semiotics of art', *Meaning and Choice in Language: Studies for Michael Halliday* (Norwood, NJ, 1995), pp. 172–3.
60 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 3, p. 342.
61 – F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality: a Metaphysical Essay*, 3rd edn (New York, 1899), pp. 12–13. Metaphysical denunciations of the 'adjectival' pervade Stokes's earliest works amidst praise for other parts of speech discussed by Bradley. See e.g. Stokes, *The Thread of Ariadne*, p. 201.
62 – Virgil C. Aldrich, 'Review of Stokes, *The Image in Form*', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 32 (1973–74), p. 132. Stokes's relation to Kant is discussed in Peter Leech, 'Art and the representation of mind: a study of the psychoanalytic sources of the aesthetic of Adrian Stokes', unpublished PhD thesis, McMaster University, 1976. For a summary of Stokes's understanding of Bradley's place in the tradition of Hegel and Kant, see Adrian Stokes, *The Thread of Ariadne*, pp. 59–75. As it happens that summary ends with a sensitive and fascinating contrast between the verbal and visual intelligence expressed in Luini's *Christ's Dispute with the Elders* in the National Gallery, London.
63 – For example *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 204, where the world seems tilted up into 'quasi-pictorial', Eurocentric perspective whose background is the 'East' and foreground the 'North'; cf. Stephen Bann, *The Inventions of History: Essays on the Representation of the Past* (Manchester and New York, 1990), pp. 28–9, on the Deistic perspectival ordering of history by William Stukely and Lord Macaulay.
64 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 111. In an article that contains plagiarism and howlers, Peggy Deamer, 'Adrian Stokes and critical vision', *Assemblage*, 2 (1987), p. 21, characterizes Stokes's descriptions in *Venice* with some skill, but unecessarily adverts to their 'symbolism', a word that Stokes usually uses disparagingly.
65 – For example Adrian Stokes, 'Primary process, thinking and art', *A Game that Must Be Lost* (London, 1973), p. 122: 'I had thought of calling this paper *Identity in Difference*, a phrase that forty years ago I used frequently in descriptions of aesthetic functioning . . .' For Bradley and the Taj Mahal, see Adrian Stokes *The Thread of Ariadne*, pp. 159–60. As Bradley conceives of Reality passing into Appearance, so Stokes evokes an effect in which the marble of the Taj Mahal has passed physically unchanged but conceptually transformed into the form of the building. (Richard Wollheim develops a similar analogy in *F. H. Bradley*, 2nd edn (Harmondsworth, 1969), pp. 223–4 and 227.) For Giorgione's Castel Franco Madonna, see *Sunrise in the West*, pp. 45–7. This passage might be read as a personification of Appearance, in the figures of the Madonna and St Francis who search the stone floor, versus Reality, in the figure of St Liberalis who gazes straight ahead after taking trust 'from the ardour of blue skies'. For Bradley and Venice, see *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, p. 185: 'Amid the sea Venice is built from the essence of the sea.' For Bradley and the Tempio, see ibid., p. 197: 'The Tempio Malatestiano at Rimini is an ideal quarry.'
66 – For example in *Venice: an Aspect of Art, Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 136: 'we are in a position to say that since we harbour the idea of a good object (i.e. God) . . . it is a contradiction to conceive this power to be also outside us'. It is significant, however, that this is a *philosophical* argument.
67 – Ibid., vol. 2, p. 99.
68 – Geoffrey Newman, 'Adrian Stokes and Venice', p. 257.
69 – As does Alberti in *Art and Science: a Study of Alberti, Piero della Francesca and Giorgione* (1949), *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 188; his 'trained eye grasped a widening order of interdependent values comprising the vast system of the outside world'.
70 – Adrian Stokes, 'Primary process, thinking and art', p. 122.
71 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 112.
72 – Geoffrey Newman, 'Adrian Stokes and Venice', pp. 254 and 257.
73 – Adrian Stokes, 'Primary process, thinking and art', p. 127.
74 – Geoffrey Newman, 'Adrian Stokes and Venice', p. 260.
75 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 134. The issue is perhaps more complex than this, however. When Stokes writes, ibid, p. 111, that 'the Quattro Cento building *by itself* expresses the solution of manifold directions, manifold movements of the spirit as might a vigorous face. This philosophy comes to us entirely in aesthetic terms' he is probably arguing consciously against the view that psychoanalytical meaning can be gained from the psychoanalytical couch rather than from works of art and architecture contemplated in solitude, but that does not infer he thinks that meanings obtained from the latter are any whit less psychoanalytical.
76 – Geoffrey Newman, 'Adrian Stokes and Venice', p. 260.
77 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 134. Despite what I earlier called the plotless, freely associative visuality of Stokes's books, this sentence signposts the simple literary structures he gave to his own books. He explains the necessity for such structures in 'Pisanello', p. 163: 'every artist, every thinker even, accomplishes his tricks to hold something tight and together . . . a Form which . . . enables a collocation'. Similarly, in the very last book of Stokes's Renaissance series, *Art and Science* (1949), *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, pp. 188, 195 and 199, the structure is signposted as a simple psychological progression from Alberti's moodless theory to Piero's love of geometrical perspective to Giorgione's relaxation into landscape painting based on tonal gradation, though this is also a development from abstract scientific thought to empathic representational art (Stokes's characteristic reversal of Wilhelm Worringer's thesis in *Abstraction and Empathy: a Contribution to the Psychology of Style* (1908)).
78 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, pp. 115–16. The dream was inscribed by Doge Andrea Dandolo in the fourteenth century.
79 – Ibid., pp. 111 and 130.
80 – Ibid., pp. 103, 210, 131 and 119.
81 – Ibid., pp. 89, 91, 89 and 93. Stokes would have discussed Kandinsky in his protracted conversations with the Russian constructivist sculptor Naum Gabo in Cornwall at this time.
82 – Ibid., p. 103.
83 – Ibid., p. 133.
84 – Ibid., p. 137.
85 – Ibid., p. 89.
86 – Geoffrey Scott, 'Humanist values', *The Architecture of Humanism: a Study in the History of Taste* (New York, 1924), p. 216. Scott was known to Stokes's friends, the Sitwells, but Stokes would have admired such a passage as an architectural equivalent of Berenson's 'tactile values' in painting. For his equivocal feelings towards Berenson, see Richard Read, 'Freudian psychology and the early work of Adrian Stokes', *PN Review 15*, 7 1 (1980), p. 38.
87 – Samuel Butler, *Erewhon* (1872), introd. Peter Mudford (Harmondsworth, 1970), p. 206.
88 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, pp. 98–9.
89 – *Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 21, pp. 70–1.
90 – Cf. *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 115: 'There is no quarrel between the styles in Venice: all contribute.'

91 – Ibid., p. 108. Arguably the first appearance of Freud's metaphor is in the 'Genoa' section of *The Quattro Cento* (1932), ibid., vol. 1, pp. 57–60, but see also *Smooth and Rough*, ibid., vol. 2, pp. 229 and 238.
92 – In an account of two days spents with Stokes at Venice in 1929, Evelyn Waugh devotes three flattering pages in *Labels: a Mediterranean Journal* (London, 1930), pp. 158–60 to the skills and knowledge required to write about the city, explaining why, 'since there seems no probability of my ever becoming anything more considerable than one of a hundred globe-trotting novelists', he will continue his cruise without attempting to do so: 'What can I possibly write, now, at this stage of the world's culture, about two days in Venice, that would not be an impertinence to every educated reader of this book?' Perhaps Stokes confirms Waugh's verdict on himself when he writes in *Venice, Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 94: 'At twilight the biggest ships funnel a way to the open Adriatic. They carry with them nothing of Venice . . .'
93 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 115.
94 – Ibid., vol. 1, p. 36. I can find no trace of Baron Corvo's homoerotic work *The Desire and Pursuit of the Whole: A Romance of Modern Venice*, introd. A. J. A. Symonds, with foreword by W. H. Auden (London, Toronto, Melbourne and Sydney, 1934) in Stokes's Venetian books, but it makes surprise appearances elsewhere in his oeuvre.
95 – Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 112, 129 and 137. Cf. *The New Science of Giambattista Vico* (1744), trans. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca, New York, 1948), pp. 116–17. The surest indication of Stokes's interest in Vico around this time is that at the beginning of his autobiography *Inside Out: a Study in the Aesthetic and Psychological Appeal of Space* published two years after *Venice*, the author starts with an early recollection of his brother casually pointing out a thundercloud as a portent that comes to fruition in a storm that very afternoon. This apparently private recollection is both a Kleinean fantasy of frightening parental intercourse and an echo of one of Vico's most famous passages in which the origin of language, religion and human society is ascribed to the giants' humanizing fear of thunder. The latter is summarized by John D. Shaeffer, *Sensus Communis: Vico, Rhetoric, and the Limits of Relativism* (Durham and London, 1990), p. 92: 'a few giants . . . were frightened and astonished by the great effect [lightning and thunder] whose cause they did not know, and raised their eyes and became aware of the sky . . . they pictured the sky to themselves as a great animated body, which in that aspect they called Jove, the first god of the so called greater gentes, who meant to tell them something by the hiss of his bolts and the clap of his thunder. And thus they began to exercise that natural curiosity which is the daughter of ignorance and the mother of knowledge, and which, opening the mind of man, gives birth to wonder.' From this we may gather that it is Vico, as well as Roger Fry, who is intended when Stokes exclaims in *Inside Out, Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 151: 'Vision, as well as Design, lay in the effortless sky alone'. Stokes's final Viconian essay is 'Listening to clichés and individual words', *A Game that Must Be Lost*, pp. 9–22. The Viconian aspect of Stokes's thought cannot be divorced either from psychoanalysis or from his interest in Proustian recollection whose principles he appears to summarize in *Venice, Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 136–7: 'Within the terms of a particular stimulus the whole of a man's experience is expressed anew each moment of consciousness.' For an unpublished essay on Proustian consciousness, see Stokes, 'Notes for a book beginning August 1943 (a transcript from the notebooks of Adrian Stokes in the possession of Ann Angus)', ed. and introd. Richard Read, *PN Review 15*, 7 (1980), pp. 41–2. This is in fact the draft version of the 'Envoi' to *Venice: an Aspect of Art.*
96 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 99.
97 – Geoffrey Newman, 'Adrian Stokes and Venice', p. 260.
98 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 112. Stokes contacted the doctor-husband of an old girlfriend to secure the right term.
99 – *Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 21, pp. 70–1. At the time of writing I was unaware of Malcolm Bowie's brilliant demonstration, in 'Memory and Desire in Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents*', *New Formations*, 26 (1995), pp. 1–14, of how the entire literary structure of Freud's book undoes this caveat or renders it ambivalent.
100 – Wollheim, 'Memories of Adrian Stokes — presented by Eric Rhode', *The Listener* (13 December 1973), p. 813.
101 – This sentence underlies the distinction between carving and modelling in the brilliant contrast between Verrocchio's *Madonna and Child with Angels* and Piero della Francesca's *Baptism* in the Appendix to *Colour and Form, Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, pp. 77–9.
102 – University Notebooks, *c.* 1920–3. Before this passage Stokes had written: 'The performing of the bid of the moral imperative *is an end-in-itself without any kind of calculation*, as in all inspiration. Here Kant has touched on the essence of morality. This is the pair and the one that connects Kant up with D. H. Lawrence.'
103 – '*Bradley Criticism*', Notebooks, *c.* 1920–3.
104 – Walter Pater, *The Renaissance*, p. 179.
105 – Richard Wollheim, 'Adrian Stokes', *On Art and the Mind: Essays and Lectures* (London, 1973), p. 334.
106 – Adrian Stokes, *The Thread of Ariadne*, p. 110. See also ibid., pp. 61 and 108–9: 'how falsely conceptions have been separated . . . and . . . frozen in words'; 'Words divide and generalise — two huge and accumulating divergencies . . . Words are the most universal, the most helpful and most difficult method to avoid, of making things easy . . .' That these attitudes to languages were not forgotten with his early books, see *Smooth and Rough, Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 235: 'Processes of thought divide experience: they construct as well a mosaic from what has been broken. Abstract terms illustrate the dual emprise.'
107 – 'More snap!', at least, was a comment to be found on one of his undergraduate essays in his Notebooks.
108 – Herbert Read, *English Prose Style* (London, 1928), p. 31: his 'metaphors conceal the meaning; they are cloaks for incomplete thought processes.'
109 – George Saintsbury, *A History of English Prose Rhythm* (London, 1912), p. 425. It may even have been Bradley who reinforced Stokes in Pater's famous dictum from *The Renaissance*, p. 188, that the 'service of philosophy, of speculative culture, towards the human spirit, is to rouse, to startle it to a life of constant and eager observation'. Cf. F. H. Bradley, *The Principles of Logic*, quoted in T. S. Eliot, 'Francis Herbert Bradley' (1927), *Selected Essays* (London, 1932), p. 447: 'the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism. That the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensuous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless movement of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or unearthly ballet of bloodless categories.' T. S. Eliot might be right in thinking that the style of this passage is Arnoldian, but Stokes would have recognized that the ideas were those of Pater's 'Conclusion', *The Renaissance*, ibid., p. 188, when 'analysis leaves off'. The best analysis of this moment remains Richard Wollheim, 'Walter Pater as critic of the arts', *On Art and the Mind: Essays and Lectures* (London, 1975), passim.
110 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 88.
111 – See Adrian Stokes, *Sunrise in the West*, p. xi: 'an Academic "realistic" canvas seems a strange and flippant distortion, and one in most dubious taste, to a Chinaman. For a technique in representation is only evolved . . . by emphasis upon a peculiar mode of vision.' For the attack upon empiricism, see ibid., p. 29: 'Nothing is so essentially an abstraction as a fact. For abstractions alone are concrete, things well-made and well-rounded, prepared to form the arms of an alternative in their definiteness, ready to be tossed to and fro, interchanged and related like coinage . . . Each fact has, so to speak, a relevancy percentage which is added to that of others to form the

weight of an argument. Systematic philosophy has been the attempt to discover a fact which is independent of all relations and conditions, an attempt the avowed object of which is a contradiction in terms . . . An absolute fact is in the same manner nonsense as the number nine without the conception of other numbers . . .' Stokes carries the argument over into aesthetics in 'Pisanello', p. 162: 'existence is larger than meaning, but existence is but a meaning like everything else, and like everything else must indicate balancing contrasts'.

112 – Adrian Stokes, 'Notes for a book beginning August 1943', p. 42.

113 – Ibid., p. 238. Though 'Appearance' is a Bradleyan term, 'Thing-in-itself' is Kantian. In *Venice, Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 137, Stokes characteristically rejects the Bradleyan dualities of Appearance and Reality then backhandedly revives them in the psychoanalytical theories of his analyst, Melanie Klein: 'Every philosophy is based upon an opposition of terms. Its aim is either to describe their interaction and find the absolute in the interaction or combination itself, or else to reduce the one to terms of the other and thereby create an absolute. It is worth while to contemplate in a way that philosophers have not done before philosophizing, the generic pair of opposites in which our lives are cast. The new-born baby soon becomes aware that neither his mother nor the surrounding world is an extension of himself. Henceforth, to his dying day, there remains the huge division between himself and objects, people or things'.

114 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 99. Stokes does acknowledge in *Smooth and Rough, Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 235, that: 'Unconscious mechanisms at the back of behaviour are less particularized the deeper they are probed; at some distant point the rocks of psychological necessity give place to the molten bed of biological urge'.

115 – Stephen Bann, 'Art history in perspective', *The Inventions of History*, p. 226.

116 – E. H. Gombrich, *Aby Warburg: an Intellectual Biography* (Oxford, 1970) p. 122: 'Warburg . . . considers that a work of this kind should be treated as a key to the psychology not only of the artist but also of the patron and, through him, of a whole period. Behind this approach we can discern Lamprecht's conception of pictorial art as the direct indicator of a period's mentality; but we also realize that in Warburg's hand this method has changed . . . The concrete elements of Ghirlandajo's frescoes must represent different facets of Renaissance mentality, of the same mentality that speaks to us from the documents of the time which Warburg had begun to read with such eagerness.'

117 – Cf. Michael O'Toole, *The Language of Displayed Art*, p. 87.

118 – *The Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 3, p. 332. This aspect of the theory derives from Ruskin's pronouncement on Tintoretto's 'Imagination penetrative', *Modern Painters*, vol. 2, *The Works of John Ruskin*, vol. 4, p. 260 that 'the mind of the beholder is forced to act in a certain mode, and feels itself overpowered and borne away by that of the painter, and not able to defend itself, nor go which way it will'.

119 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 132.

120 – John Barrell, *The Dark Side of the Landscape: the Rural Poor in English Painting, 1730–1840* (Cambridge, 1980), passim.

121 – Jacqueline Rose, *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (London, 1986), p. 4.

122 – Terry Eagleton, 'The ideology of the aesthetic', in *The Politics of Pleasure: Aesthetics and Cultural Theory*, ed. Stephen Regan (Buckingham and Philadelphia, 1992), p. 19.

123 – Phyllis Grosskurth, *Melanie Klein: Her World and Her Work* (London, 1985), p. 227.

124 – Hartwig Isernhagen, '"A constitutional inability to say yes:" Thorstein Vebel, the reconstruction program of *The Dial*, and the development of American Modernism after World War I', in *Year Book of Researching English and American Literature* (1982), p. 169. On the errors of aestheticizing psychoanalysis, see Jacqueline Rose, *Why War? — Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Return to Melanie Klein* (Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA, 1993) p. 144, and Malcolm Bowie, *Lacan* (London, 1991), pp. 168–71.

125 – Walter Pater, *The Renaissance*, pp. 116–17.

126 – *The Works of John Ruskin*, vol. 7, p. 385 and Pater, *The Renaissance*, p. 115.

127 – *The Works of John Ruskin*, vol. 7, p. 375.

128 – Walter Pater, *The Renaissance*, p. 118.

129 – Ibid., p. 117. Walter Pater, ibid., p. 103, had initiated the poetry/painting analogy by distinguishing the 'merely poetical, or what may be called literary interest' from 'that true pictorial quality'.

130 – Notebooks; cf. Walter Pater's musical fusion of 'matter and form' in 'The school of Giorgione', *The Renaissance*, p. 109.

131 – Letter from Hugh Kenner to present author, 28 July 1983. Kenner continues: 'Pound and *The Stones of Rimini* emblematized a naive past he had cut connections with.'

132 – Richard Read, 'Art criticism versus art history: the letters and works of Adrian Stokes and E. H. Gombrich', *Art History*, 16/4 (1993), pp. 508–10.

133 – For the instrumental nature of the crisis in the creation of the myth, see Alberto Tenenti, 'The sense of space and time in the Venetian world of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries', in *Renaissance Venice*, ed. J. R. Hale (London: Faber & Faber 1975), pp. 27, 31 and 32; for a broader history of Venice as a political idea, see Felix Gilbert, 'The Venetian Constitution in Florentine political thought', in *Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence*, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (London, 1968), pp. 463–500.

134 – Stokes argued thus against Ruskin, who had deplored the degeneracy of the lower classes in the 'St Mark's' chapter of *The Stones of Venice II*. Stokes, *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 199, is indulgent towards those locals whom his photographs catch sleeping or sitting around eating and drinking in the protective bower of their architecture. Correspondingly, those children whom Ruskin, *The Works of John Ruskin*, vol. 10, p. 85, berated for clashing their bruised centesimi with 'every heavy glance of their young eyes full of desperation and stony depravity', are granted a far more wholesome influence from the Venetian environment in Stokes's *Smooth and Rough, Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 245: 'Like mothers of men, the buildings are good listeners . . . Nowhere do children appear more active than in an architectural *mise en scène*, the original pitch for most ball-games'.

135 – Ibid., p. 203.

136 – Ibid., p. 244.

137 – Ibid., pp. 210 and 196.

138 – Ibid., p. 117.

139 – Ibid., p. 93.

140 – Adrian Stokes, 'The profundity of Liberalism', unpublished typescript: 'It is of the very zest of life that there should be these two sources of meaning curbing each other yet heightening each other's effects. Until this is realized, we will only get action and reaction — the alternating pushings of one kind of meaning to replace the other which is over-emphasized and thus has lost its significance. Thus — the emphasis of one age is on Individualism, of the next on co-operation — and unless the issue is changed because it is found to be a false one, the alternation will proceed in the same way.'

141 – Durham Stokes, *The Last Step* (London, 1929), p. 13. In his Preface the author devotes the pamphlet to 'one whose fund of knowledge and brilliant attainments would enable him, if he could be tempted, to do justice to the supreme importance of this subject'.

142 – Ibid., p. 25. This reflects the commonplace bourgeois view of 'The state as a work of art' in Jacob Burckhardt, *The Civilization of the Renaissance* (1860).

143 – Durham Stokes, *The Last Step*, p. 28.

144 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, pp. 88, 109, 94 and 106.

145 – Adrian Stokes, *The Thread of Ariadne*, p. 219.

146 – *The Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 131.

147 – Ibid., p. 116 and 131.

148 – Ibid.
149 – Walter Pater, *The Renaissance*, p. 99.
150 – See Ronald Bush, 'Modernism, Fascism, and the composition of Ezra Pound's *Pisan Cantos*', *Modernism/Modernity*, 2/3 (1995), pp. 69–87.
151 – Orlo Williams, in a favourable review of *Venice* in the *National Review* (October 1945), p. 339 — press cutting in the possession of the Adrian Stokes Estate. Though only the anonymous review-writer of 'Stones of Venice: a post-Ruskinian Rhapsody', *TLS*, 6 October 1945, p. 474, condemns Stokes's work for its associations of 'Poundian froth', a cold wind was generally blowing on *Venice* in other press cuttings of 1945. Some make the usual criticism of stylistic preciousness (*New Statesman, Listener, Spectator*); *Punch* attacks its 'chilly' aesthetic dogma; the critic of the *Birmingham Post* intelligently criticizes its failure to appreciate the religious character of Venice and its architecture; though the *Sunday Express* and *Liverpool Post* do report brisk sales.
152 – Adrian Stokes, Notebooks, September 1931.
153 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, pp. 88, 91, 94 and 95.
154 – John Premble, *Venice Rediscovered* (Oxford and New York, 1996); Richard J. Goy, *Venetian Vernacular Architecture: Traditional Housing in the Venetian Lagoon* (Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne and Sydney, 1989).
155 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 133.
156 – Virgil C. Aldrich, 'Review of Stokes, review of *The Image in Form*', op. cit., p. 132, argues that Stokes's 'theory of art was eventually snared by the single string of psychoanalytic argument, a Freudian version modified by Melanie Klein'. David Carrier made a similar, though more sympathetic point in 'Adrian Stokes and the theory of painting', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 13 (1973), p. 136.
157 – Jacqueline Rose, 'Negativity in the work of Melanie Klein', *Why War?*, p. 139.
158 – Melanie Klein, *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* (1932), trans. A. Strachey (London, 1937), pp. 361–2.
159 – *The Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 157.
160 – Ibid., p. 135.
161 – Ibid., p. 93.
162 – See e.g. Michael Warner, 'Homo-narcissism; or, heterosexuality', *Engendering Men*, eds. J. A. Boone and M. Cadden (London and New York, 1990), p. 202.
163 – Joan Rivière, quoted in Jacqueline Rose, 'Negativity in the work of Melanie Klein', *Why War?*, p. 152.
164 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 2, p. 147.
165 – Jacqueline Rose, *Why War?*, p. 149.
166 – *Critical Writings of Adrian Stokes*, vol. 1, p. 230.
167 – Newman, 'Adrian Stokes and Venice', p. 260.